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The impetus for writing this book came from being in various 
rooms where those concerned with public law and administrative 
justice – working in research, legal practice, policy-making, the 
charity sector and other vocations – were gradually reckoning 
with the impact of technology on their sphere of activity. There 
have long been lawyers with a specialist interest in technology, 
but now it is all public lawyers who are having to pay attention 
to technology’s diverse impacts. Such changes can, especially for 
those operating at the coalface, be difficult to make sense of in 
a wider context. Yet a wider understanding is an essential part 
of formulating appropriate responses to these developments. 
My hope is that this short book will provide a framework that 
assists and encourages readers to do that sort of thinking about 
the challenges and opportunities that technology presents for 
the administrative justice system.
In writing this book, I have incurred numerous debts of 
gratitude. Dr Richard Kirkham gave very detailed and helpful 
comments on Chapter One. He also encouraged me to take up 
the task of writing this book in the first place. I presented some 
of the ideas in Chapter One at a conference on administrative 
justice in Wales organised by Dr Sarah Nason, where participants 
gave many helpful comments. Chapter Two has been a focus 
area of my research in the past few years. I have presented ideas 
on crowdfunded judicial reviews at both the University of 
Oxford and the University of Essex, where input from attendees 
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helped me to develop my thinking. I am particularly grateful to 
Professor Maurice Sunkin for comments at various events and 
on various draft papers, which always gave me cause to think 
further. Chapter Three builds on research that I have been doing 
with various people in recent years, in particular with Professor 
Robert Thomas and Byron Karemba. I presented the ideas that 
form the basis of Chapter Three at the Melbourne Public Law 
Conference in the summer of 2018. Chapter Four benefited 
from a variety of discussions, including with the dedicated 
civil servants working on various ongoing reform projects. A 
visiting position at Osgoode Hall Law School in 2017, which 
was kindly supported by Professor Lorne Sossin (now Justice 
Sossin), allowed me to engage with the Winkler Institute on 
some of these issues, as well as others in Toronto interested in 
the field of legal design. Toronto provided the space to develop 
much of the research presented in Chapter Four.
I have benefited greatly from many discussions on the topic 
of digitalisation generally, including with Professor Robert 
Thomas, Professor Carol Harlow, Professor Roger Smith, 
Caroline Sheppard, Sara Lomri, Professor Michael Adler, Dr Jen 
Raso, Dr Kristen Rundle, Dr Abi Adams, Dr Jeremias Prassl, 
Margaret Doyle, Dr Natalie Byrom and Matthew Ahluwalia. Dr 
Adam Harkens provided excellent research assistance on various 
parts of the book. The UK Administrative Justice Institute and 
the Administrative Justice Council also provided lively forums 
to discuss ideas relating to digitalisation.
A particular note of thanks is reserved for the exceptional 
team at the Public Law Project, an organisation where I have 
been fortunate enough to serve as Research Director since 2017. 
The team at the Public Law Project is an incredibly reflective 
and creative group of practitioners and researchers. Working 
with them has forced me to rethink some of my assumptions 
(which may have otherwise been left intact within the walls of an 
academic institution). Seeing them grapple with the unfolding 
HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) reform project, 
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and various other technological developments within the public 
law system, was a key part of the motivation for writing this 
book. All views expressed here are mine and do not represent 
the policy of the Public Law Project.
The team at Bristol University Press – particularly Helen 
Davis, Rebecca Tomlinson and Christie Smith – have been 
fantastic to work with in the production of this book. They 
understood and supported the purpose of the book from the 
outset.
Finally, I must record a sincere thanks to my family and 
friends for putting up with me for the long periods I have had 
my head in my books and laptop while researching public law, 
administrative justice and digitalisation. A particular thanks goes 
to my partner, Elizabeth, who not only puts up with me, but 
also encourages me every day.
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JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL STATE
Preface
Administrative justice – the processes through which the state 
makes decisions about people and the avenues by which they can 
challenge those decisions – is increasingly affected by technology. 
Early attempts at ‘E-government’ now appear to be accelerating 
at speed towards the full emergence of the digital administrative 
state. This short book examines three very different ways in 
which the UK’s administrative justice system is changing due 
to the influence of technology: the increase in crowdfunded 
judicial reviews; the digitalisation of tribunals; and the adoption 
of ‘agile’ methodologies by civil servants tasked with building 
the administrative justice system. Taking a functional approach, 
this book sets out a framework for understanding and analysing 
the varied impacts of new technology on administrative justice, 
revolving around four central issues: evidence, politics, models 
and design. It argues that, while the growing role of technology 
should not make us lose sight of the fact that the essential 
character of government will remain a social, human endeavour, 
ensuring justice in the digital state is a task that requires us to 
both study closely the empirical consequences of technology 
and revisit, and maybe even abandon, existing frameworks for 




E-government has been with us for many years – since the early 
1990s in fact – although at first only in the sense of technical 
assistance with repetitive tasks, such as filing cabinets leaving 
the office floor and going online, email replacing the post, and 
so on. This was hardly challenging. The first experiments with 
algorithmic risk assessment, video-linked evidence in court and 
telephonic legal advice that followed were readily accepted by 
lawyers while the arrival of parking adjudicators, the first online 
hearings in this country, went virtually unnoticed. Recently, 
however, the pace of change has accelerated sharply, impinging 
more on legal processes. While the administrative assistant is 
taking on the role of sorcerer’s apprentice who, with his robotic 
friends, is colonising the legal world, we, like the sorcerer, have 
mostly been sleeping.
Joe Tomlinson, however, has joined the handful of pioneering 
lawyers who have set out to question, evaluate and explain the 
new developments. He has drawn attention at academic seminars 
and conferences to the changes that are occurring in the area 
of administrative justice that is his particular specialism, and the 
potential problems they may throw up. He has worked with the 
Public Law Project to get together empirical evidence of what is 
x
going on. He has used the new technology to publicise the issues 
by posting blogs and subscribing to online hubs and networks. 
This new book takes his work a stage further. By bringing 
together earlier case studies on which he has been working, 
he conveys a warning about changes to the system as a whole.
The first case study concerns the funding of judicial review, 
made perilous by savage cuts to legal aid. Tomlinson looks 
at crowdfunding as a possible answer, and the arrival on the 
scene of commercial and political platforms, with the possible 
effects on public interest litigation as the impending model of 
judicial review. Given that crowdfunding is still in its infancy, 
Tomlinson is right to be tentative in his conclusions. While it 
has helped support cases that would not have otherwise been 
brought, crowdfunding has the potential to disrupt ‘relatively 
stable patterns and practices of public interest judicial review 
litigation.’ So watch this space carefully.
In the area of tribunals, where digitalisation is proceeding 
alongside a steady closing down of real tribunals and courts, 
access to justice is a major issue. The government maintains 
that online processes will increase access to justice for the 
many; in the light of the experience with Universal Credit, 
those who work with applicants for social security benefits are 
less sure. Tomlinson calls the reforms ‘a major policy gamble 
by a government under pressure to reduce costs.’ Linking 
digitalisation with the trend to replace tribunal hearings 
with internal, mandatory review, Tomlinson argues that any 
online appeal system must be ‘designed to fit into the wider 
administrative justice landscape’, raising the question, how is 
digital justice being adopted, designed and made?
Tomlinson provides a simple introduction to the world of 
‘agile’ and ‘design thinking’ approaches that dominate the 
thinking of the Government Digital Service and have infiltrated 
government policy-making in recent years. On the credit side, 
‘agile processes’ place ‘a greater emphasis on evidence-based 
policy-making’; they can be more open and participatory, 
FOREWORD
xI
allowing the actual voices of users to be heard. Keeping an 
open mind on a practice that is clearly in its infancy, Tomlinson 
confines himself to recommending that greater space must be 
made for ‘wider concerns of ethics and good governance’ within 
the design-thinking mindset and the ‘agile processes’ by which 
it is carried through.
Under the influence of American thinking and notably the 
pioneering work of Jerry Mashaw (Bureaucratic Justice; Managing 
Social Security Claims, Yale University Press, 1983), administrative 
justice itself has travelled a long way in a relatively short time 
– from a handful of High Court actions to an Administrative 
Court, from a random assortment of tribunals to tribunals as 
equal partners with the civil courts, from courts and tribunals to 
at least the conception of an inclusive and ‘proportionate’ set of 
processes for dispute resolution. Technology will, by and large, 
facilitate the journey to redress. On the way, a set of core values 
has been built into administrative justice: openness, fairness and 
impartiality; accountability, transparency and participation; the 
right to a hearing and other due process values; and access to 
justice as a constitutional right. These are hard-won values that 
we must be careful not to compromise. I am therefore grateful 
to Joe Tomlinson for providing a framework which assists 
and encourages readers to do that sort of thinking about the 
challenges and opportunities that technology presents for the 
administrative justice system.  I hope that his short and accessible 
book will be widely read and discussed.
Carol Harlow is Emerita Professor of Law at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science
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The administrative justice system is the mechanism through 
which government makes decisions about citizens’ rights 
and entitlements (in respect of, for example, social security, 
immigration and housing), and the processes through which 
people can challenge those decisions (for example, through 
judicial review, ombuds and tribunals).1 By scale, administration 
is by far the largest part of the state: it is where high-level 
policy discussions transform into the street-level coercion of 
citizens.2 Like many other areas of law, society and government, 
administrative justice is now beginning to see the impacts of 
rapid technological advances. Early attempts at ‘E-government’ 
1 Administrative justice is also considered to be an aspect of the public 
and administrative law systems. I use the terms flexibly here. For a recent 
overview of the dynamics within administrative justice, see Thomas, Robert 
and Tomlinson, Joe (2017) ‘Mapping current issues in administrative justice: 
Austerity and the “more bureaucratic rationality” approach’, Journal of Social 
Welfare and Family Law, 39(3), 380.
2 Zacka, Bernardo (2017) Where the State Meets the Street: Public Service 
and Moral Agency, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
1
and using ‘ICT’3 are now accelerating towards the emergence of 
the digital administrative state, and the prophecies of futurologists 
are being put to the test.4 The essential promise of technology 
remains, as it always has done, of more and better for less 
effort.5 The fundamental concern also remains the same; that 
by using new technology, we alienate older methods – and 
their benefits – that we ought to be preserving.6 Looking at 
the present situation surrounding the developing digitalisation 
of administrative justice, it is clear that some new political 
dynamics are emerging as a result of recent changes. Activists 
are using online crowdfunding platforms to fund challenges 
to the policies of the government in the courts, advancing 
their campaigns through social media.7 At the same time, a 
Conservative government – pursuing a long-term programme 
of fiscal austerity in response to the global financial crisis of 
2008 – is attempting the most ambitious digitalisation of courts 
3 See, for example, Margetts, Helen and Partington, Martin (2010) 
‘Developments in E-government’, in Michael Adler (ed) Administrative 
Justice in Context, Oxford: Hart Publishing, Chapter 3; Bovens, Mark and 
Zouridis, Stavros (2002) ‘From Street-level to System-level Bureaucracies: 
How Information and Communication Technology Is Transforming 
Administrative Discretion and Constitutional Control’, Public Administration 
Review, 62(2), 174–84.
4 Susskind, Richard (2017) Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your 
Future (2nd edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5 Similar basic claims made about technology were seen during the Industrial 
Revolution; see, for example, Daunton, Martin (1995) Progress and Poverty: 
An Economic and Social History of Britain 1700–1850, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
6 Ibid.
7 For instance, there has been a string of crowdfunded claims (of variable 
merit) seeking to challenge the government’s approach to Brexit, such as 
R (Webster) v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU [2018] EWHC 1543 
(Admin); R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5.
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and tribunals ever seen.8 The gamble is that slashing the justice 
budget, cutting approximately 5,000 court staff and closing 
hearing centres will not undermine but improve access to justice 
if the promise of technology is realised.9 These examples merely 
scratch the surface of how digitalisation is starting to change the 
workings of administrative justice.
How are we to make sense of the present situation and the 
changes ahead? This is a core question facing many of those 
concerned with the administrative justice system in the UK: 
policy-makers, civil servants, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), judges, lawyers, researchers, citizens and others. This 
is also a puzzle for international observers, who are seeing – or 
will likely soon see – the impacts of technology on administrative 
justice in their own jurisdictions. In this book I set out a 
framework – based on four central issues – for understanding and 
analysing the varied impacts of new technology on administrative 
justice. I then apply this framework in the context of three 
case studies in each of the subsequent chapters. In selecting the 
case studies included here, my aim is not to be comprehensive, 
but to consider a wide range of technology-linked changes to 
administrative justice processes in the UK.10 The case studies 
8 These reforms are discussed in detail in Chapter Three. For general context, 
see Rozenberg, Joshua (2018) The Online Court: Will IT Work?, Guildford: 
Legal Education Foundation; Thomas, Robert and Tomlinson, Joe (2018) 
‘Remodelling social security appeals (again): The advent of online tribunals’, 
Journal of Social Security Law, 25(2), 84–101.
9 Ministry of Justice (2016) Transforming Our Justice System, London. 
For a recent overview, see National Audit Office (2018) Early Progress in 
Transforming Courts and Tribunals, HC 1001, Session 2017–2019; House 
of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2018) Transforming Courts 
and Tribunals, HC 976.
10 There are thus lots of areas I do not cover here which require detailed study. 
One important area is administrative decision-making; see, for example, 
Eubanks, Virginia (2018) Automating Inequality: How High-tech Tools 
Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor, New York: St Martin’s Press; Oswald, 
Marion (2018) ‘Algorithm-assisted decision-making in the public sector: 
3
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cover instances of the effects of technology both in internal 
government processes as well as external justice processes, such 
as courts and tribunals. They examine examples of changes 
imposed as part of public service provision and also where 
technology has led to change from the ground up. Some of the 
studies concern ‘hard’ process changes involving technology, 
whereas others look at the ‘soft’ cultural influence of technology 
and its associated modes of thought.
In Chapter Two I examine the growing use of crowdfunding 
– raising money via online platforms – as a means of covering 
the costs of judicial review cases. In Chapter Three I look 
at the ongoing HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) 
‘transformation’ project, which is putting courts and tribunals 
on a digital footing. My particular focus in that chapter is on 
the digitalisation of tribunals, where individuals can appeal 
government decisions. In the final chapter, I consider the 
use of new ‘agile’ methodologies – adopted and promoted by 
the technology industry and subsequently, civil servants – in 
building administrative justice systems. All of these issues throw 
up complex questions but, as has increasingly been recognised 
in recent years, the need for analysis in this quickly changing 
aspect of the administrative justice landscape is becoming more 
urgent, and so far, such analysis has been relatively scarce.
The approach adopted and advocated for in this book is 
a functionalist one.11 My operating assumption is that the 
administrative justice system is ultimately social in character, as 
Framing the issues using administrative law rules governing discretionary 
power’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 376, 2128.
11 For a detailed account of the foundations of this approach, see Loughlin, 
Martin (2005) ‘The functionalist style in public law’, University of Toronto 
Law Journal, 55, 361–403; Loughlin, Martin (2014) ‘Modernism in British 
public law, 1919–1979’, Public Law, 56. This is not an uncontested 
approach; for context, see Loughlin, Martin (1992) Public Law and 
Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Nor, too, is the identification of 
functionalism a distinct approach; see, for example, Craig, Paul (2015) UK, 
4
JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL STATE
it still fundamentally revolves around the collectivist activities 
carried out by the state. Given this, my view is that administrative 
justice ought to evolve with society and be part of promoting a 
healthy body politic, focusing not just on controlling state power 
but enabling it too. I adopt the outlook that it is important 
to study all aspects of the relationship between law and 
administration – including the approach of administrators and 
all systems of redress – and not just the law as it is discussed by 
judges in courts. From this starting point, I suggest it is helpful 
to keep in mind four interrelated central issues that anyone 
seeking to understand the digitalisation of administrative justice 
must grapple with. These issues, which have long been core 
concerns of the administrative justice community, are evidence, 
politics, models and design. I will now elaborate each aspect of 
this framework in more detail.
Evidence
Digitalisation presents a set of new developments, and the 
primary task at the outset must be to understand the nature 
and impacts of these developments. Does the introduction of 
online social security appeals lead to more or less people being 
in receipt of benefits? Does the use of crowdfunding lead to 
more judicial reviews claims being lodged? Discussion about 
administrative justice has often suffered from a deficient evidence 
base. If we are to make claims about what systems ought to 
look like, facts are highly relevant. This may seem obvious, 
but public law research in the UK has failed regularly in this 
most fundamental of descriptive tasks in recent years. Although 
there are some noteworthy exceptions,12 the priority of the 
EU and Global Administrative Law: Foundations and Challenges, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p 103 et seq.
12 For instance, Maurice Sunkin has made a significant contribution to the 
understanding of how the judicial review system works in practice; see, for 
5
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majority of public law research – in line with prevailing academic 
trends13 – is to try to identify ‘the patterns, continuities, and 
discontinuities thinking displays, and the manner in which it 
shapes the politically possible.’14 As a result, the field of public 
law is now heavy on insight and light on descriptive accounts 
of what is actually happening within the system.15
One consequence of this situation is that important debates 
about the desired outcomes that systems ought to achieve, or 
how systems ought to be designed, are complicated or obscured 
by lack of knowledge about (often relatively basic) facts.16 
example, Sunkin, Maurice, Calvo, Kerman, Platt, Lucinda and Landman, 
Todd (2007) ‘Mapping the use of judicial review to challenge local authorities 
in England and Wales’, Public Law, 545–67; Sunkin, Maurice and Bondy, 
Varda (2008) ‘Accessing judicial review’, Public Law, 647; Sunkin, Maurice 
and Bondy, Varda (2009) ‘Settlement in judicial review proceedings’, Public 
Law, 237–59; Bondy, Varda, Platt, Lucinda and Sunkin, Maurice (2015) The 
Value and Effects of Judicial Review: The Nature of Claims, their Outcomes 
and Consequences, London: Public Law Project. For a wider context, see 
Halliday, Simon (2012) ‘Public Law’, in C. Hunter (ed) Integrating Socio-
Legal Studies into the Law Curriculum, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp 141–60.
13 These trends are well traced in Tschorne Venegas, Samuel (2016) ‘The 
theoretical turn in British public law scholarship’, PhD thesis, London: 
London School of Economics and Political Science.
14 Freeden, Michael (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p 39; Freeden, Michael (2000) ‘Practising ideology and ideological 
practices’, Political Studies, 48, 302–22, p 304. 
15 Those interested in understanding the details of systems have commonly 
delved into to sub-fields such as social security law, immigration law, tax 
law and regulation; see, for example, Thomas, Robert (2011) Administrative 
Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing.
16 A very good example of this is the debate around how costs in judicial review 
cases are distributed. Lord Justice Jackson undertook a detailed review over 
a number of years, yet the absence of data (particularly quantitative data) 
in the review was remarkable; see Lord Justice Jackson (2009) Review of 
Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report; Lord Justice Jackson (2017) Review of 
Civil Litigation Costs: Supplemental Report, Fixed Recoverable Costs.
6
JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL STATE
This situation could have often been avoided – or its impact 
could at least have been mitigated – if there was more focus in 
public law research on building descriptive accounts of how the 
administrative justice system works. This neglect of evidence-
gathering can also be linked, at least in part, to the fact that 
administrative justice policy and system design has remained 
largely in the grip of professional judgement (mostly that of 
lawyers and civil servants) instead of moving towards greater 
reliance on evidence.17 Whereas medicine has been able to 
transform itself into a primarily evidence-based science in the 
last century,18 public law research – and law more generally – has 
largely resisted following a similar trajectory.19 
In recent years, there have been some attempts by public 
lawyers, often with political science and social science 
backgrounds, to undertake empirical research on a range of 
important public law questions; for example, do constitutionally 
entrenched fundamental rights generally deliver on their promise 
of protecting people from harm and promoting social welfare?20
Researchers undertaking these studies are coming under 
increasing fire for a variety of reasons, often because of concerns 
about the links between cause and effects being drawn and 
17 For a general discussion, see Greiner, D. James and Matthews, Andrea 
(2016) ‘Randomized control trials in the United States legal profession’, 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 12, 295–312.
18 Meldrum, Marcia L. (2000) ‘A brief history of the randomized control trial: 
From oranges and lemons to the Gold Standard’, Hematology/Oncology 
Clinics of North America, 14(4), 745–60.
19 See Greiner and Matthews (note 17 above).
20 See, for example, Law, David S. and Versteeg, Mila (2013) ‘Sham 
constitutions’, California Law Review, 101(4), 863–952; Chilton, Adam 
S. and Versteeg, Mila (2016) ‘Do constitutional rights make a difference?’, 
American Journal of Political Science, 60, 561–81, p 575; Chilton, Adam 
S. and Versteeg, Mila (2018) ‘Rights without resources: The impact of 




a perceived failure to properly contextualise claims.21 Such 
critiques may have some validity in particular instances. 
However, there are many basic questions about administrative 
justice where concrete data could be gathered and where such 
data could have great practical utility.22 For instance, why are 
successful appeals from immigration decisions successful? This 
is a basic and fundamental question of administrative justice for 
which evidence could be found but a question about which 
there is little clear, systematic evidence available at present. 
Evidence will not give us complete answers about administrative 
justice – we cannot hope to measure our way out of making 
value judgements – but a better evidence base can provide a 
firmer platform on which to judge how best to pursue aims. 
In a recent speech, the Senior President of Tribunals, Sir 
Ernest Ryder, explained that digitalisation and other reforms 
are required to enable the judiciary to secure the effective 
administration of justice. However, the Senior President noted 
that future reforms can no longer be predicated on the views of 
a single judge formed on the basis of anecdote or impression: 
‘reform must be based on proper research; robust and tested.’23 
He concluded: ‘[i]f we are to secure open justice, all questions 
must be capable of being asked and examined. But examined 
properly. The judiciary must therefore support, promote, and 
commission research. Just as the unexamined life is one not 
worth living; the unexamined and unresearched reform may 
not be worth taking.’
It is a recurring theme of this book that there is insufficient 
evidence available to properly address the questions that the 
digitalisation of administrative justice presents, even at this 
21 Woods, Andrew Keane (2008) ‘Discounting rights’, New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics, 50, 509.
22 Certain processes can also be studied in detail with great success; see, for 
example, Thomas (note 15 above).
23 Sir Ernest Ryder (2018) Securing Open Justice, Max Planck Institute 
Luxembourg.
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relatively early stage of developments in the digitalisation 
of administrative justice. As such, further empirical research 
and data collection will be a vital tool in this area in the 
future. Empirical research and nuanced data collection could 
enable better understanding, better learning, better design 
and continuous improvement. It can analyse and validate the 
implementation of reforms by providing robust insights into 
how they are operating. Understanding digitalisation will require 
the use of a range of empirical methodologies and, moreover, 
would be enhanced by the pursuit of further methodological 
innovation.24 For now, informed accounts on the evidence that 
is available is the best that can be hoped for.
Politics
A second key aspect of understanding and analysing digitalisation 
is reckoning with, what we may broadly call, the politics 
surrounding it. It has long been recognised25 that administrative 
justice systems are, to some extent, artefacts of political beliefs: 
‘[b]ehind every theory of administrative law there lies a theory of 
the state.’26 These systems – which include both the law and the 
mechanisms that give practical effect to it – are, at foundational 
level, instruments through which political objectives can be 
achieved.27 We also cannot escape the role of political judgement 
in assessing them. By using the terms ‘politics’ I do not hope 
24 In particular, under-used methods such as randomised control trials could 
be explored further in the context of online procedures; see Greiner and 
Matthews (note 17 above).
25 See, for example, Laski, Harold (1925) A Grammar of Politics, Sydney, NSW: 
Allen & Unwin, p 578; Carr, Cecil (1941) Concerning English Administrative 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 10–11.
26 Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard (2009) Law and Administration (3rd 
edn), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1, p 1.
27 Duguit, Leon (1921) Law in the Modern State (translated by Frida Laski 
and Harold Laski), Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin.
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to conjure up the image of something nefarious or unhelpfully 
partisan (although the tone of present public discourse on politics 
may create that assumption).28 Instead, I mean simply a position 
on the desired outcomes a society and government ought to 
pursue. In this sense, accounts of whether changes linked to 
digitalisation are a success or not will ultimately be framed by 
political judgements of various kinds.
To be clear, politics exists in many variations and all politics 
can be relevant to the assessment of administrative justice. There 
is the obvious, broad left–right divide, as well as the myriad 
positions concealed within that simplistic categorisation. There 
are also particular politics that emerge around specific policy 
issues. For instance, the politics of technology, the politics of 
judicial review and the politics of the legal professions are all 
highly relevant to some of the issues discussed in this book. 
There is also a distinct politics of ‘good administration’ – that 
is, political views on the extent to which good government 
itself ought to be prioritised and promoted.29 Even claims 
about commitment to the Rule of Law are imbued, or can be 
associated, with political preferences of some kind.30
All politics – whether they are the politics of those in public 
office or private citizens – are relevant insofar as they provide 
both the conditions in which developments in the digitalisation 
of administrative justice will take place and inform the metrics by 
which those developments can and will be assessed by reference 
28 Flinders, Matthew (2012) Defending Politics, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
29 See, for instance, the discussion on the politics of administrative justice 
oversight in O’Brien, Nick (2012) ‘Administrative justice: A libertarian 
Cinderella in search of an egalitarian prince’, The Political Quarterly, 83(3), 
494–501; O’Brien, Nick (2018) ‘Administrative justice in the wake of I, 
Daniel Blake’, The Political Quarterly, 89(1), 82–91.
30  See, for example, Bingham, Tom (2011) The Rule of Law, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, which is orientated towards a liberal, internationalist conception 
of the state.
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to. In my analysis, presented in the next three chapters of this 
book, it will inevitably be the case that certain preferences will 
be advanced and defended. To be able to assess the digitalisation 
of administrative justice, we must be prepared to understand 
and confront differing political assessments of various elements 
of digitalisation. 
Models
To understand the digitalisation of administrative justice we 
must also think closely about the concepts that we commonly 
rely on when discussing the system. In December 1998, Martin 
Partington, a central figure in the development of the modern 
study of administrative justice, gave a lecture on the topic of 
‘Restructuring administrative justice’ at University College 
London.31 There, he outlined some of the key concepts of 
administrative justice: openness, confidentiality, transparency, 
secrecy, fairness, efficiency, accountability, consistency, 
participation, rationality, equity and equal treatment. There has 
been no shortage of other attempts to state the key concepts 
– often also described as ‘principles’ or ‘values’ – that an 
administrative justice system ought to respect. Indeed, it was 
observed by the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council 
that the UK has a rich history of developing principles for 
administrative justice.32 Many such attempts have come from 
institutions that engage with and are (or were) part of the 
administrative justice system itself.33 Academic work also often 
31 Partington, Martin (1999) ‘Restructuring administrative justice? The redress 
of citizens’ grievances’, Current Legal Problems, 52(1), 173–99.
32 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (2010) Developing Principles 
of Administrative Justice.
33 See, for example, Health Service Ombudsman (2009) Principles of Good 
Administration; Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (2010) 
Principles of Administrative Justice.
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refers to a range of similar concepts.34 Beyond the concepts often 
specifically associated with administrative justice, the system – 
including digitalisation – can be considered through a range of 
other conceptual frameworks. It is now common, for instance, 
to see human rights analysis of administrative justice processes. 
Another common frame is that of constitutional principles (for 
example, the Rule of Law, the separation of powers, democracy, 
accountability).35 Discrimination is also a prominent frame in 
digitalisation research and discussion so far.36 Civil servants often 
refer to a particular bundle of concepts too, which often relate to 
operational concerns, for example, efficiency, proportionate use 
of resources and manageability.37 The difficulty is not, therefore, 
in suggesting concepts that may be relevant to the digitalisation 
of administrative justice, but in making sense of what to do with 
all the concepts that are often thrown around.
There are two basic tasks such concepts can be used for: 
describing the system and assessing the system. When used 
for the latter purpose (they are often described as ‘principles’ 
or ‘values’ when used to this end), concepts are no more than 
political claims articulated in another form.38 When used in 
this way, concepts can yield important insights. Talking in such 
terms can also provoke us to reflect closely on the judgements we 
34 See, for example, Mashaw, Jerry L. (1985) Bureaucratic Justice: Managing 
Social Security Disability Claims, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 
Adler, Michael (2003) ‘A socio-legal approach to administrative justice’, 
Law & Policy, 25(4), 323–52.
35 On the rise of this framework in recent years, see Gee, Graham and Webber, 
Grégoire (2013) ‘Rationalism in public law’, Modern Law Review, 76(4), 
708–34.
36 See, for example, Gangadharan, Seeta Pena and Jędrzej, Niklas (2018) 
Between Antidiscrimination and Data: Understanding Human Rights 
Discourse on Automated Discrimination in Europe, London: London School 
of Economics and Political Science. 
37 Thomas and Tomlinson (note 8 above), referring to the ‘government’ view 
on administrative justice.
38 See Loughlin (2005) (note 11 above).
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make.39 But such concepts have no objective meaning beyond 
the politics that animate them and the meaning ascribed to them 
by society. When used for explanatory purposes, concepts can 
be particularly helpful (in this context they are often referred to 
as ‘models’). Models can help us clarify how systems work, how 
they are changing, and draw useful distinctions.40 For instance, 
Jerry Mashaw’s models of administrative justice have, along with 
subsequent iterations of those models by scholars such as Michael 
Adler, provided a framework that has enabled generations of 
observers to understand significant process changes.41
Although conceptual frameworks of various types can be 
valuable, we should take care not to become too bound up in 
concepts at the expense of how administrative justice actually 
functions in practice, which should always be the primary 
consideration.42 We should also be careful to ensure that reliance 
on a variety of concepts, especially when hazily defined, does not 
lead to fuzzy thinking – which has sometimes been the case.43 
A key point about explanatory concepts made in this book 
is that, just as the growth of the administrative state and 
globalisation in the 20th century gave us cause to revisit the 
concepts through which we understood the state, the growing 
39 Nason, Sarah (2016) Reconstructing Judicial Review, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing.
40 See, for example, Rawlings, Richard (2008) ‘Modelling judicial review’, 
Current Legal Problems, 61(1), 95–123, p 103.
41 Mashaw (note 34 above); Adler (note 34 above). See also Richards, Zach 
(2018) Responsive Legality: The New Administrative Justice, Abingdon: 
Routledge; Kagan, Robert A. (2012) ‘The Organisation of Administrative 
Justice Systems: The Role of Political Mistrust’, in Michael Adler (ed) 
Administrative Justice in Context, Oxford: Hart Publishing, Chapter 
7; Halliday, Simon and Scott, Colin (2012) ‘A Cultural Analysis of 
Administrative Justice’, in Michael Adler (ed) Administrative Justice in 
Context, Oxford: Hart Publishing, Chapter 8.
42 See Duguit (note 27 above).
43 Tomlinson, Joe, ‘The Grammar of Administrative Justice Values’ 39(4) 
Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 524.
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digitalisation of administrative justice gives us cause to do so 
again.44 The alternative is to try to understand an increasingly 
digitalised state by seeking to awkwardly fit developments into 
possibly outdated frameworks, something that would risk making 
those who do so pedlars of an increasingly irrelevant nostalgia.45 
Where necessary, we should be willing to reconceptualise and 
even abandon conventional models of understanding, and 
devise new models so that we can better explain the changing 
administrative justice system. At the same time, traditional 
models may prove important in understanding wrong turns in 
digitalisation. This is a complex and constantly evolving task, 
but it is a critical one. 
Design
Administrative justice systems give rise to myriad questions of 
institutional design.46 For instance, how is the aim of having an 
44 For instance, see Rubin, Edward (2005) Beyond Camelot: Rethinking Politics 
and Law for the Modern State, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
45 See Rubin, ibid, p 6. The infamous example of this in English administrative 
law is A.V. Dicey’s rejection of the existence of administrative law in England 
and Wales: Dicey, Albert Venn (1959) Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of the Constitution (10th edn), Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp 336–8. He later 
had to abandon this position (at least partially) in the face of overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary: see Dicey, Albert Venn (1915) ‘The development 
of administrative law in England’, Law Quarterly Review, 31, 148. See also 
the critique of Maurice Hauriou and Henri Berthelémy in Duguit (note 27 
above). 
46 By institutions I mean ‘the structures that are to house and refine our disputes 
and the processes that are to regulate the way we resolve them’, a definition 
taken from Waldron, Jeremy (2013) ‘Political political theory: An inaugural 
lecture’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 21(1), p 8. On institutional design 
in administrative justice in the UK context, see Bondy, Varda and Le Sueur, 
Andrew (2012) Designing Redress: A Study About Grievances against Public 
Bodies, London: Public Law Project; Tomlinson, Joe and Lovdahl Gormsen, 
Liza (2018) ‘Stumbling towards the UK’s new administrative settlement: A 
study of competition law enforcement after Brexit’, Cambridge Yearbook of 
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easy-to-access online tribunal appeal form realised? What should 
the costs rules applicable to crowdfunded judicial reviews be? 
How can perceptions of judicial independence be maintained 
in video-linked hearing processes? Digitalisation presents 
many such design questions. In one sense, the design of public 
institutions is the bread and butter of what public lawyers do and 
are interested in.47 The actual task of designing public institutions 
is, however, notoriously difficult. Moreover, the administrative 
justice system is, to borrow the phrasing of Richard Stewart, 
densely complex.48 In this context, designing (or reforming) 
administrative justice systems is a task riddled with unresolvable 
tensions and trade-offs. Gunther Teubner argues that these 
systems are placed under the competing demands of efficacy, 
responsiveness and coherence.49 That is to say, citizens and others 
demand administrative bodies to be successful in managing their 
role, to be responsive to the public will and to be aligned with 
the foundational commitments of society. Teubner contends 
that any design or re-design of an administrative institution that 
sought to improve its performance in one of these three respects 
would almost certainly have negative effects on at least one of 
the other two. In other words, ‘from one or another perspective, 
European Legal Studies, 20, 233–51. For a US perspective, see Mashaw, 
Jerry, L. (2005) ‘Structuring a dense complexity: Accountability and the 
project of administrative law’, Issues in Legal Scholarship, 5(1).
47 For example, Madison, James (1987) ‘Federalist No 51’, in James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (eds) The Federalist papers, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, p 319. More recently, there have been wide-
ranging discussion on constitutional design; see, for example, Ginsburg, 
Tom (ed) (2012) Comparative Constitutional Design, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
48 Stewart, Richard B. (1975) ‘The reformation of American administrative 
law’, Harvard Law Review, 88, 1667, p 1813.
49 Teubner, Gunther (1987) ‘Juridification: Concepts, aspects, limits, 
solutions’, in Gunther Teubner (ed) Juridification of Social Spheres: A 
Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust, and Social 
Welfare Law, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 3–48.
15
A FUNCTIONAL FRAMEWORK
every institution will fail, or be seen as partially failing.’50 In 
this light, the pursuit of administrative justice could be seen 
as a ‘perpetually unsatisfactory project of institutional design’, 
which even has ‘a certain fatalistic hue.’51 While institutional 
design is no easy task, it remains at the unavoidable core of 
administrative justice. 
In respect of digitalisation in particular, the approach advocated 
for in this book is that control of institutional design questions 
ought not to be yielded to those who possess technological 
expertise. There is a risk of this in discussions around digitalisation 
because new technology can be difficult to understand, and 
it comes with its own (often hidden) methods and politics 
when deployed in institutions.52 The social, human project 
of government is still the essential nature of the administrative 
justice project and the increasing use of technology should not 
make us lose sight of this.53 Moreover, at least for the foreseeable 
future, humans will still be operating digital systems, and they 
will certainly be designing them.54 Technologists have no special 
authority to make claims about institutional design beyond 
purely technological solutions. Technology is best conceived as 
a new material that has been discovered, which is to be added 
to the existing materials used in building systems. We should 
understand it as a means for advancing the functions of the state, 
not as some sort of transcendental change. In this sense, the 
digitalisation of administrative justice is similar to the expanding 
50 See Mashaw (note 34), p 14.
51 Ibid.
52 For a discussion, see Mulligan, Deirdre K. and Bamberger, Kenneth A. 
(2018) ‘Saving governance-by-design’, California Law Review, 106(3).
53 See, generally, Broad, Ellen (2018) Made by Humans: The AI Condition, 
Melbourne, VIC: Melbourne University Press.
54 On this aspect of digitalisation, see Raso, Jennifer (2017) ‘Displacement 
as regulation: New regulatory technologies and front-line decision-making 
in Ontario works’, Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 32(1), 75–95, p 
75.
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use of contracted-out services in the 1980s – it is a new method, 
not a new end. The use of digital technology may bring about 
or represent changing politics and the form of technology-
enabled decision-making may itself have certain consequences, 
but technology is no more than one tool in a state’s toolbox 
(and it is certainly not a tool with magical properties which can 
somehow circumvent questions of politics).55 The basic task of 
public lawyers remains, as Sir Ivor Jennings put it in 1936, to 
‘advise as to the technical devices which are necessary to make 
the policy efficient and to provide justice for individuals.’56
A starting point
Having set out a framework for analysing the progressive 
encroachment of technology in administrative justice, the 
following chapters offer my analysis of three significant, recent 
developments. My ambition is that the framework used here 
will be a robust way for others approaching the digitalisation of 
administrative justice to analyse what can often seem, especially 
for those working at the frontlines of these changes, tricky to 
assess at a macro level. On the basis of the analysis presented in 
the next three chapters, I suggest practical recommendations 
for each area.
My analysis in this book is a starting point in at least two 
senses – one practical and one more significant. At this early 
stage in the digitalisation of administrative justice, there is a 
limited evidence base to operate on, and further experiences 
with developing technologies may ultimately lead to different 
conclusions being drawn in the future. Moreover, any analysis 
of the digitalisation of administrative justice – the same as any 
position taken on the shape and function of the state – is open 
55 More will be said on this topic, in Chapter Four in particular.
56 Jennings, William Ivor (1936) ‘Courts and administrative law’, Harvard Law 
Review, 49, 426, p 430.
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to being contested.57 For those who disagree with the arguments 
advanced here, my hope is that such disagreement provokes 
more detailed thinking on the important challenges presented 
by ensuring justice in an increasingly digital state.
57  As Loughlin has pointed out, ‘[t]here is no metaphysical truth, there are no 
transcendent standards of correctness that lie outside the practices’; see 
Loughlin (2005), p 66 (note 11 above).
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TWO
Crowdfunding and the changing dynamics 
of public interest judicial review
Judicial review is the system through which an individual ought 
to be able to go to a court and ask for a review of whether state 
action in respect of a certain issue is lawful. If the answer is 
no, there are various remedies the court can deploy to ensure 
government complies with the law. In performing this role, the 
courts are often said to be doing the job of upholding the Rule 
of Law. This simple account of judicial review is, as Harry Street 
once observed, ‘a nice idea … but we just don’t have it.’1 This 
has been so for a range of reasons in recent history. Perhaps the 
primary failing of the present judicial review system is one of 
expense: judicial review is a ‘Rolls-Royce’ process that few can 
afford.2 This state of affairs was recently described as ‘public law’s 
disgrace.’3 It is while facing this reality that potential claimants 
1 Street, Harry (1975) Justice in the Welfare State (2nd edn), London: Stevens 
and Sons, p 65.
2 Hickman, Tom (2017) ‘Public law’s disgrace’, 9 February, UK Constitutional 




have started to use crowdfunding platforms to raise money in 
order to bring judicial review claims.4 Crowdfunded claims have 
included high-profile ‘public interest’ challenges on new policies 
relating to junior doctors’ pay5 and the triggering of Brexit under 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union.6 Although there is 
an increasing volume of crowdfunded judicial reviews, little has 
been said about this change – a shift which is, essentially, citizens 
using technology to gain access to an administrative justice 
processes in a way they may not have otherwise been able to.
In this chapter I explain how crowdfunding works and the 
changes in practice we have seen in recent years, particularly in 
relation to public interest judicial review cases. My argument is 
that these changes may be changing the model of public interest 
litigation from closed to open. I also argue that, while it may bring 
benefits of various kinds, in its present state crowdfunding is an 
unstable practice and, without some level of regulation, it risks 
unintended consequences.7 I propose in this chapter that such 
4 Hamman, Evan (2015) ‘Save the reef! Civic crowdfunding and public interest 
environmental litigation’, Queensland University of Technology Law Review, 
15(1), 159; Gomez, Manuel, A. (2015) ‘Crowdfunded justice: On the 
potential benefits and challenges of crowdfunding as a litigation financing 
tool’, University of San Francisco Law Review, 49(2), 307; Elliot, Michael 
(2016) ‘Trial by social-media: The rise of litigation crowdfunding’, University 
of Cincinnati Law Review, 84(2), 529; Perry, Ronen (2018) ‘Crowdfunding 
civil justice’, Boston College Law Review, 59, 1357–95.
5 Justice for Health v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWHC 2338; 
[2016] Med LR 599. See also Dyer, Clare (2016) ‘Junior doctors’ High 
Court challenge to Jeremy Hunt’, British Medical Journal, 13 September, 
354 (www.bmj.com/content/354/bmj.i4975). 
6 See, for example, R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 WLR 583; R (Webster) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the EU [2018] EWHC 1543 (Admin).
7 I have developed wider aspects of this argument in more detail in Tomlinson, 
Joe (2019) ‘Crowdfunding public interest judicial reviews: A risky new 
resource and the case for a practical ethics’, Public Law, 166.
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regulation ought to be orientated at lawyers who bring or act 
in crowdfunded judicial review cases.
The developing use of crowdfunding for judicial review
Within the context of a policy of fiscal austerity,8 recent years 
have seen the government claim to have concerns about the 
expense of the justice system, and judicial review has been 
part of this. In a judicial review case, the government incurs 
two main costs, which are, of course, ultimately met by the 
taxpayer: first, defending the claim; and second, providing funds 
to support the court system in processing the case (for example, 
the provision of a hearing venue, a judge and court staff). At the 
same time of justice budgets being cut, there was talk of judicial 
review being a forum for ‘weak or ill-founded claims’ that were 
taking up ‘large amounts of judicial time and costing the court 
system money.’9 Subsequently, there were reforms that sought 
to restrict access to judicial review.10 Reforms to the judicial 
review process were also completed in a context where funding 
cuts across the justice system were being made. For instance, 
there was a vast reduction in the amount of legal aid available 
to publicly fund cases. These changes had consequences for the 
bringing of judicial reviews.
Making sense of the economics of the judicial review process is 
no easy task. There is a complex landscape of costs rules, courts 
8 For an overview and analysis of the effects of austerity on the wider 
administrative justice system, see Thomas, Robert and Tomlinson, Joe 
(2017) ‘Mapping current issues in administrative justice: austerity and the 
“more bureaucratic rationality” approach’, Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law, 39(3), 380–99.
9 Ministry of Justice (2012) ‘Judicial review consultation’, Press release, 13 
December (www.gov.uk/government/news/judicial-review-consultation).
10 Ministry of Justice (2014) Judicial Review: Proposals for Further reform, 
Cm 8703; Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
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fees, cost caps and other features, which are all interconnected.11 
There is only limited empirical evidence on how this economic 
dimension of judicial plays out in practice.12 Crowdfunding is 
connected with this wider economic landscape in multiple ways, 
but it is primarily a funding method.
For those trying to fund a judicial review, there are a few 
options at present. You could simply pay privately if you have 
deep enough pockets. You will have to, typically, pay the costs 
of a solicitor and counsel on an hourly basis. Alternatively, you 
may be able to agree a fixed fee in advance. However, some 
lawyers may be unwilling to provide fixed fee arrangements if 
a case is unpredictable or they have not had the opportunity 
to fully develop a view on the nature and merits of the case. 
Because of this, sometimes fees are fixed initially, but if the 
claim is successful, then full fees as paid (something usually 
called a discounted fee agreement). A conditional fee agreement 
is also possible – sometimes referred to as ‘no win now fee 
agreements’.13 If a claim fails, a claimant may also need to cover 
the costs of the government’s legal fees, or part of them. 
How much a judicial review costs varies widely from case to 
case. If a case settles early, costs may be limited. But if it goes 
to a full hearing, they may be considerable. One estimate, from 
2007, suggests that a typical judicial review can incur costs from 
11 Low Beer, Ravi and Tomlinson, Joe (2018) Financial Barriers to Judicial 
Review, London: Public Law Project.
12 Bondy, Varda, Platt, Lucinda and Sunkin, Maurice (2015) The Value and 
Effects of Judicial Review: The Nature of Claims, their Outcomes and 
Consequences, London: Public Law Project.
13 Lawyers are able to charge a success fee of up to 100% if the case is won 
to compensate them for the risk of being paid nothing. However, since April 
2013, success fees are no longer recoverable from the defendant, but must 
instead be paid by the claimant. Given the non-monetary nature of judicial 
review, the prospect of paying a success fee often makes a conditional fee 
agreement expensive and unattractive.
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£10,000 to £20,000.14 However, complex cases can be much 
more expensive. In 2017, Tom Hickman, a judicial review 
practitioner, suggested that a ‘very simple’ case that took a 
two-hour hearing would cost around £8,000 to £10,000.15 
By contrast, a ‘moderately complex claim lasting a day and not 
brought against a central government department’ could cost 
beyond £40,000. For a ‘substantial’ judicial review heard over 
two days, Hickman estimates costs will run to between £80,000 
and £200,000. There is no clear data on this, but it is clear that 
costs for cases that go to a full hearing can be significant.
Public funding, in the form of legal aid, is available for some 
cases.16 The rules relating to legal aid are incredibly complex. 
Broadly speaking, to get funding a claimant has to be ‘within 
scope’ and eligible for legal aid,17 satisfy a means test,18 and prove 
that the merits of the claim are sufficient to satisfy the merits 
test.19 In recent years, access to legal aid has been restricted and 
the overall budget vastly reduced. This has caused great concern 
14 Public Law Project (2007) How to Fund a Judicial Review Claim When Public 
Funding Is Not Available, London: Public Law Project, para 1, which was 
informed by a discussion with practitioners. Further and similar estimates are 
available in a response to a Ministry of Justice consultation made available 
via a Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) request; see FOIA Request 
No 171204020.
15 Hickman (note 2 above).
16 Legal aid grants also come with a level of costs protection. Before the event 
insurance policies (typically included in home and motor insurance policies) 
fund various types of litigation, but are ill suited to non-monetary claims 
where remedies are discretionary, and so are not generally available to cover 
judicial review proceedings.
17 Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, Sections 9 
and 10.
18 Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 
2013 (SI 2013/480) (as amended).
19 Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/104) (as 
amended).
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about an access to justice crisis.20 In respect of judicial review 
in particular, Hickman has argued powerfully that they are part 
of an access to justice crisis that is ‘public law’s disgrace.’21 He 
suggests that the ground-level reality is that ‘people who have 
£169.15 or more per week for themselves and their family to 
live off, or who have any significant assets, do not qualify for legal 
aid.’22 Available data indicates that there are now considerably 
fewer judicial reviews supported by legal aid than just a few 
years ago.23
Overall, the landscape for judicial review funding is, at present, 
one where resources have become scarce. However, costs are 
still high. Public interest judicial review (that is, those cases that 
seek to raise points of general public importance or change an 
approach to an issue) also finds itself within that landscape. There 
is now an extensive literature which discusses public interest 
litigation and the availability of funding – and the expense of 
courts processes more broadly – is widely discussed as a key factor 
in what litigation is actually brought.24 As funding becomes 
scarcer, litigation that makes wider public interest arguments 
20 This was clear in the discussion around the Bach Commission; see The 
Bach Commission (2017) The Right to Justice: The Final Report of the 
Bach Commission, Fabian Policy Report, London: Fabien Society. See also 
Hickman (note 2 above).
21 Hickman (note 2 above).
22 Ibid.
23 Data on this issue was made available under an FOIA request; see FOIA 
Request No 171020004.
24 For an early example, see Vose, Clement (1959) Caucasians Only, Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, pp 119, 240. For a more recent 
discussion, see Hilson, Chris (2002) ‘New social movements: The role 
of legal opportunity’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2), 238–55; 
Andersen, Ellen Ann (2006) Out of the Closets and Into the Courts: Legal 
Opportunity Structure and Gay Rights Litigation, Ann Arbor, MI: University 
of Michigan Press; Vanhala, Lisa (2012) ‘Legal opportunity structures and 
the paradox of legal mobilization by the environmental movement in the 
UK’, Law & Society Review, 46(3), 523–56.
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may also become more difficult.25 It is in these conditions of 
greater scarcity and concerns about access to justice in which 
crowdfunding took off in the UK.
Crowdfunding is a method of raising money for a project via 
an online platform. The general use of crowdfunding across 
different parts of society has expanded rapidly in the last few 
years. It primarily emerged because, after the global financial 
crash of 2008, banks could not meet the demand for finance 
and an ‘alternative finance economy’ developed. This alternative 
finance economy is quickly becoming an important part of the 
UK economy.26 In 2013, £666 million was raised in the UK 
through crowdfunding platforms. This went up to £1.74 billion 
and £3.2 billion in 2014 and 2015 respectively.27 Government 
has also signalled its support for crowdfunding. In 2012, at a time 
of sweeping public spending cuts, the Coalition government 
invested £20 million in businesses via crowdfunding platforms 
and made a further £40 million investment in 2014.28 Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the speedy growth of this form of fundraising has 
left many questioning whether regulation now needs to adapt 
to these new activities.29
25 Various third party funders – such as charitable trusts or the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission – still sometimes back judicial reviews, but the 
overall funding landscape remains more baron than it was in the recent 
past.
26 Zhang, Brian, Baeck, Peter, Ziegler, Tanya, Bone, Jonathan and Garvey, 
Kieran (2015) Pushing Boundaries: The 2015 UK Alternative Finance 
Industry Report, Nesta. 
27 Ibid, p 11.
28 BIS (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills) (2014) ‘New £40 million 
investment by British Business Bank to support £450million of lending to 
smaller businesses’, Press release, 25 February (www.gov.uk/government/
news/new-40-million-investment-by-british-business-bank-to-support-450-
million-of-lending-to-smaller-businesses).
29 Armour, John and Enriques, Luca (2018) ‘The promise and perils of 
crowdfunding: Between corporate finance and consumer contracts’, Modern 
Law Review, 81(1), 51–84. The Financial Conduct Authority is also now 
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As a method of litigation funding, crowdfunding is best seen 
as a form of third party funding.30 Historically this type of 
funding was prohibited, but the rules changed in recent decades, 
and now third party funding is seen as a key part of the justice 
system.31 Lord Justice Jackson, in his landmark review of civil 
litigation costs, considered that third party funding is in principle 
‘beneficial and should be supported’, because, among other 
benefits, it ‘provides an additional means of funding litigation 
and, for some parties, the only means of funding litigation [and 
thus] promotes access to justice.’32 With crowdfunding, money 
donated through the online platform forms a fund, which is the 
third party funder of the case. Some have drawn a distinction 
between ‘investment-based’ crowdfunding models, where 
investors have a financial stake in a monetary claim and seek to 
make profit, and ‘non-investment-based’ crowdfunding models, 
where the investor’s reward is non-monetary or non-existent.33 
There are multiple players on the UK crowdfunding scene 
at present. Two seem particularly important in the context of 
judicial review. First, there is CrowdJustice, an organisation 
taking various steps in respect of crowdfunding platforms. For instance, 
it considers certain forms of crowdfunding – loan-based crowdfunding 
and investment-based crowdfunding – to be regulated activities under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
30 This was defined by Lord Justice Jackson as funding by a ‘party who has no 
pre-existing interest in the litigation, usually on the basis that (i) the funder 
will be paid out of the proceeds of any amounts recovered as a consequence 
of the litigation, often as a percentage of the recovery sum; and (ii) the 
funder is not entitled to payment should the claim fail’; see Lord Justice 
Jackson (2009) Review of Civil Costs: Final Report, p xv. 
31 For an overview, see Lord Neuberger (2013) ‘From Barretry, Maintenance 
and Champerty to Litigation Funding’, Harbour Litigation Funding Lecture 
(www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-130508.pdf). See also Radin, Max 
(1935) ‘Maintenance by Champerty’, California Law Review, 24, 48–78, p 
49; Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142, p 153 (Lord Mustill).
32 Lord Justice Jackson, p 117 (note 30 above).
33 Perry (note 4 above).
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that provides and manages an online platform for those seeking 
to raise funds for a case. CrowdJustice allows ‘case owners’ to 
develop a page on the its website, to promote the case and 
facilitate online donations. On these pages, there is a target 
amount and deadline. These pages can then be circulated 
online to encourage donations. CrowdJustice does not offer 
legal advice – it simply facilitates the fundraising. The platform 
requires that users of the site have instructed a qualified lawyer 
and leaves the details of the case, and how it is presented to the 
public, to individual case owners. If a funding target is met, 
CrowdJustice takes a 6% ‘platform fee’, plus VAT, from the 
overall total raised, and transfers the rest into the case owner’s 
solicitors’ client account. Where a target is not met, the platform 
does not take a fee, pledges are cancelled and donations are not 
taken. When a case goes forward but there is money left over, 
the money goes back to CrowdJustice, but the case owner can 
decide to put that to another case on the site or to the Access 
to Justice Foundation. In the case of donations beyond £1,000, 
donors have the option of a pro rata refund.
Another key organisation on the UK crowdfunding scene is 
the Good Law Project. This is not a crowdfunding platform 
but it is a new organisation that is, in essence, a creature of 
crowdfunding success. The director of the Good Law Project, 
Jolyon Maugham QC, had a career as a successful tax barrister 
before he gained significant traction on social media. He used 
crowdfunding to fund judicial reviews he was bringing that had 
some wider political motivation. These activities evolved into 
the Good Law Project. It is an expressly political project, which 
seeks to drive social change through litigation.34 Its focus areas 
include tax, workers’ rights and Brexit. The first case the Good 
Law Project was involved centred on the argument regarding 
34 Details of the background of the organisation are set out in Maugham, Jolyon 
QC (2017) ‘The Lawyer as Political Actor’, Annual Queen Mary University 
of London Law and Society Lecture.
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the Brexit process ultimately decided by the Supreme Court 
in Miller.35 The argument in this case was famously published 
in a blog shortly after the referendum.36 Maugham then 
crowdfunded initial advice on the basis of the blog (although 
this was one of multiple efforts around the same issue). After that 
initial foray, cases have included a high-profile challenge to the 
Electoral Commission’s response to accusations of misconduct 
in the Brexit referendum.37
Beyond the high-profile work of Mr Maugham QC, the 
crowdfunding community more widely is ambiguous. Further 
research on who is involved and their experiences could shine 
fresh light on how this new platform is being used.
Emerging politics of crowdfunding
The emerging politics around crowdfunding is complicated. 
There are various strands that interact at various points. First, 
there is the politics of particular crowdfunded campaigns. The 
politics of campaigns are, quite naturally, often specific to the 
case. Challenges around Brexit have, in recent years, been a 
particular hotspot for successful campaigns. These campaigns 
have large groups of receptive and politically active donors. 
However, some campaigns pursued via crowdfunded cases can 
also bring up local issues. Given the need to campaign and given 
that crowdfunding requires donors that are capable of accessing 
and using the internet, social media has become a key space for 
35 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (see note 6 
above).
36 The legal argument was outlined in Barber, Nick, Hickman, Tom and King, 
Jeff (2016) ‘Pulling the Article 50 “trigger”: Parliament’s indispensable 
role’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 27 June (https://ukconstitutionallaw.
org/2016/06/27/nick-barber-tom-hickman-and-jeff-king-pulling-the-article-
50-trigger-parliaments-indispensable-role).
37 R (The Good Law Project) v Electoral Commission & Others [2018] EWHC 
2414 (Admin).
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the expression of the political components of crowdfunding. 
Often, individuals leading crowdfunding campaigns seek to 
engage in public debate on platforms such as Twitter, both as 
part of wider campaigning activities but also to draw attention 
to the crowdfunded case. This raises the question of whether the 
campaigning is for the case or whether the case is an instrument 
of political campaigning. Traditional public interest litigation 
organisations have typically been more restrained in engaging 
in political argument in the social media and crowdfunding 
contexts. Instead, they typically adopt conventional campaigning 
practices with integrated crowdfunding links.
Beyond the politics of individual case campaigns, the 
crowdfunding platforms responsible for hosting and administering 
campaigns have particular objectives. For instance, CrowdJustice 
states its mission to be ‘to give more access to the legal system. 
We’re a team of lawyers, technologists and campaigners and 
we built CrowdJustice as a way to level the playing field.’ The 
platform is an important player as it exerts control over the 
form of campaigns and how they are administered. So far, key 
platforms seem to be acting independently, professionally and 
in a manner consistent with traditional organisations concerned 
with issues such as access to justice. However, the ‘mission’ 
aspect of the platform is still an emerging dynamic, and it will 
be interesting to see how this area evolves in the coming years.
As for the government, there appears to be no clear policy 
position on crowdfunding justice. As noted above, government 
has promoted crowdfunding in other areas of policy but has 
not yet gone so far in the justice sphere. On the one hand, 
supporting crowdfunding may be an attractive policy for a 
government that has dramatically cut public funding for the 
justice system in recent years. If crowdfunding is a success, this 
may lead to a view that is could be a useful substitute for public 
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funding in some circumstances.38 On the other hand, supporting 
crowdfunding in the justice system may lead, especially with 
recent spending cuts in mind, to a view that crowdfunding is 
a second-rate substitute for legal aid. There is no evidence at 
all that crowdfunding is or could be an effective like-for-like 
substitute for public funding. 
How crowdfunding integrates into the government’s general 
policies on judicial review is also yet to be seen. In respect of 
the judicial review, the government wears two hats as principal 
designer and constant participant in the process. This means that 
it exerts a large degree of control over the judicial review process 
and can react to new developments. If there is a growth in public 
interest judicial review due to crowdfunding or crowdfunding 
has negative effects on how such judicial reviews are managed, 
there could be long-term effects. Harlow and Rawlings have 
mapped this terrain well. They explain that government can take 
action to restrict litigation through ‘clamping down.’39 This is 
a ‘process’ that involves ‘structural or procedural change to the 
judicial review process or, put differently, procedural constraint 
designed to blunt substantive legal action.’ If many crowdfunded 
cases are poorly managed, it is difficult to imagine a clamp down 
of some kind not happening.
38 Some argue, however, that public funding may not be necessary in the way 
many often suggest; see Higgins, Andrew (2017) ‘The costs of civil justice 
and who pays’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 37(3), 687–713. There is 
also a powerful argument for considering judicial review costs as distinct 
from standard civil disputes; see Fordham, Michael (2009) ‘Rethinking 
costs in judicial review’, Judicial Review, 306; R (Davey) v Aylesbury Vale 
District Council [2007] EWCA Civ 1166; [2008] 1 WLR 878 [18] (Sedley 
LJ).
39 Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard (2016) ‘“Striking Back” and “Clamping 
Down”: An Alternative Perspective on Judicial Review’, in John Bell, Mark 
Elliott, Jason N.E. Varuhas and Philip Murray (eds) Public Law Adjudication 
in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
Chapter 13.
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The views on crowdfunding within the judiciary may also be 
significant in the long term. Much of judicial review remains 
discretionary. In practice, this means that judicial attitudes and 
thought can have meaningful impacts in cases. In terms of 
possible negative consequences, crowdfunding may risk irritating 
the judiciary by bringing explicitly political campaigning to 
the courts. There have also been concerns expressed about 
the effects of crowdfunding on litigation behaviour, such as it 
leading to grandstanding by lawyers. More broadly, increasing 
use of crowdfunding may generate unrealistic expectations that 
claimants should crowdfund if they require litigation funding. 
However, judges may also be receptive to crowdfunding as 
a means of increasing access to justice, and there are past 
examples of the judiciary liberalising gateways for public interest 
litigation.40 Moreover, there are already examples of the judiciary 
reacting positively to crowdfunding.41
The politics of crowdfunding is incredibly diverse and 
complex. It is still also in a formative stage and we can expect 
further crystallisation of different views in the coming years, 
as the experience with crowdfunded judicial reviews grows. 
What is remarkable, even at this point, is that there are very few 
(public) critical voices on crowdfunding.
From a closed to open model of public interest judicial review
The growing use of crowdfunding forces us to revisit traditional 
models of judicial review.42 In particular, it is perhaps changing 
how we ought to understand public interest judicial review.
40 See, for example, R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry [2005] EWCA Civ 192.
41 See, for example, Stephen Hawking and others v Secretary of State for 
Health & Social Care and National Health Service Commissioning Board 
(unreported), 22 February 2018.
42 There is limited modelling work on judicial review. The key authority on 
this is Rawlings, Richard (2008) ‘Modelling judicial review’, Current Legal 
Problems, 61(1), 95–123, p. 109.
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In recent decades, public interest judicial reviews in the UK 
have often been brought by organisations with expertise of such 
litigation (for example, Liberty or JUSTICE) or some particular 
policy area (for example, Greenpeace). This litigation, being 
complex, expensive and unpredictable, was treated very carefully. 
Indeed, the same few organisations were frequent players. 
These organisations, it was often observed, had similar missions. 
Public interest litigation conducted by such organisations 
usually involved experienced lawyers and senior members of 
the organisation. Organisations, in the conduct of litigation, 
had various pressures that generally led them to litigate with 
discipline and care. For instance, they were often accountable to 
a board, and sometimes their wider membership. In a sense, we 
could say that this was a closed model of public interest judicial 
review. This is not meant in a pejorative sense, but is rather to 
say the activity was almost a niche and a specialist one. As a 
result, it was a relatively stable area of litigation overall.
With crowdfunding, the closed model of public interest 
litigation could be dislodged if there are more cases brought 
by litigants from outside of the traditional group of actors. It 
has always been the case that, if a person had sufficient funds, 
they could use their own funds to challenge government via 
judicial review.43 Yet, the promise of crowdfunding is that it 
can overcome financial barriers to judicial review for the wider 
population. In so doing, it is likely that public interest judicial 
review in the UK – as an area of litigation – may become more 
diversified if crowdfunding continues to grow in importance. 
New focus areas for litigation may arise. New groups and 
people may become involved. In this way, crowdfunding may 
produce a shift from a closed to a more open model of public 
interest litigation in the UK. However, at the same time, the 
43 The spread-betting tycoon Stuart Wheeler, who challenged the UK’s 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, is a good example; see R (Wheeler) v Office 
of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin); [2008] ACD 70.
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structures that made patterns of public interest litigation relatively 
stable in recent years may not be present in the same ways. 
The story is therefore more nuanced than simply the potential 
democratisation and diversification of public interest litigation.
Design considerations for an institutional response
The design of crowdfunding is a difficult topic as the state has 
done little to address this quickly developing sphere of legal 
activity. In the absence of a formal state institution of which 
to examine the design, here I provide a survey of some of the 
key considerations that may go to informing any future design.
It is clear crowdfunding can work in some cases. Some cases 
have raised vast amounts of money. However, success is far from 
guaranteed.  For a crowdfunding campaign to be a success, there 
needs to be willing donors who are in a position to donate 
money. Sometimes, it may be the case that significant time and 
even money is required to bring attention to the campaign. 
This may not be so difficult if the issue already has a high profile 
but, for some, it could be a key barrier to crowdfunding. For 
those who are bringing claims that may not have a high level 
of popularity (such as claims by prisoners), crowdfunding 
may be of little utility. The central design question for any 
institutional response to crowdfunding is how to provide an 
effective framework to ensure risks are managed while benefits 
are optimised.
Crowdfunding campaign web pages are incredibly variable, 
and the extent of the variation demonstrates how the 
practicalities of managing a crowdfunded case give rise to some 
difficult ethical and strategic questions for lawyers. One key 
issue is when fundraising should take place. Asking for funding 
for a case can be speculative at an early stage of litigation, but 
there is only a short time window (typically three months) in 
which judicial reviews can be brought. There is also the issue 
of how much should be crowdfunded. A tension may arise 
33
CROWDFUNDING AND THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC INTEREST JUDICIAL REVIEW
here between the aims of not wanting to raise more than is 
necessary from the public and wanting to know that a case is 
properly funded. It has been argued that there may be a ‘useful 
discipline’ in ‘putting yourself in a position where you have to 
make an ongoing case for people to support the litigation.’44 
The presentation of the crowdfunding pitch also raises some 
tricky questions. Crowdfunding campaigns are directed to 
the public, and therefore there is a need for them to be put in 
simple terms. However, some may suggest that, given this is a 
legal case seeking funding, details of the claims and evidence 
being put are required. Some crowdfunding attempts only 
give very broad overviews of the case they intend to bring, 
whereas others provide detailed pleadings and other documents. 
Related to this, some crowdfunding campaigns provide clear 
updates on the progress of a case, with new documents, whereas 
others do not. At the moment, practice in the management of 
crowdfunded cases seems to vary significantly. The need for a 
consistent baseline of ethical practice is an important question 
for any institutional framework in this area.
With the possible shift from a more closed to a more open 
model of public interest judicial review that crowdfunding may 
bring, there is the chance of new actors to come on to the scene. 
Jolyon Maugham QC is a good example of the possibility of 
crowdfunding opening up who is involved in public interest 
litigation.45 As noted above, organisations that have traditionally 
been active in public interest judicial reviews had various 
pressures which generally led them to litigate with discipline 
and care (for example, being accountable to a board and their 
membership). These structures are not necessarily replicated 
for Mr Maugham QC and others following in his footsteps. 
Crowdfunders are more likely to see themselves as accountable to 
their base of donors: ‘if you are asking people to dip their hands 
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into their pockets to fund a case you need to be able to justify 
that decision to yourself – and to them.’46 With this change, 
there may be changes to the practice of public interest judicial 
review in some cases. Any institutional response to crowdfunding 
must consider the dynamics of this new landscape.
An important distinction can also be drawn between 
‘investment-based’ crowdfunding models, where investors have 
a financial stake in a monetary claim, and ‘non-investment 
based’ crowdfunding models, where the investors’ reward 
is non-monetary or intangible.47 Ronan Perry argues that 
investment-based crowdfunding is more secure as the incentives 
of the person putting their money into the case provides a kind 
of filtering, whereas in judicial review cases, where claims are 
primarily about the legality of government action and not 
monetary compensation, there is less of an incentive for donors 
to properly examine the merits of a case.48 Perry recommends 
that in non-investment-based crowdfunding models, claims 
should be subject to a professional vetting process to minimise the 
risk of generating unmeritorious claims. Different organisations 
involved with crowdfunding take different approaches to vetting. 
As outlined above, CrowdJustice requires that every individual 
or group taking a case either has a qualified solicitor or barrister 
who has been instructed, or that the case is being taken by a non-
profit organisation. The Good Law Project uses the resources 
of its director for this purpose. What level of vetting is required 
and how to ensure it in practice are key design questions.
Recommendations
Overall, crowdfunding represents a risky resource. It has the 
potential to generate unforeseen consequences by disrupting 
46 Ibid.
47 Perry (note 4 above).
48 Ibid.
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relatively stable patterns and practices of public interest judicial 
review litigation. Equally, however, crowdfunding has helped 
support valuable cases that would not otherwise have been 
brought. The cost of judicial review, and the diminished public 
funding available for it, make crowdfunding potentially more 
important. Given the contrasting aspects of crowdfunding, the 
challenge for any institutional response is to design frameworks 
that promote optimisation while minimising risk. I have argued 
elsewhere that regulation ought to be focused on lawyers as they 
possess the most significant amount of power in the bringing and 
conduct of crowdfunded judicial reviews.49 I have also suggested 
that guidance on the form of regulation can be derived from 
looking at existing professional codes.50 There is no need to 
place a straitjacket on litigation strategy, but setting a general 
ethical baseline similar to those seen in existing professional 
codes would be beneficial.
Going forward, ethical regulation of crowdfunding, based 
on detailed consultation with relevant stakeholders, should be 
considered by the appropriate regulators. For this exercise to be 
as effective as possible, a more robust empirical evidence base 
would be hugely beneficial. In the interim, key organisations 
involved in public interest judicial reviews should consider 
developing their own policies on responsible practices for 
crowdfunding for litigation.
49 Tomlinson (note 7 above).
50 See Bar Standards Board (2018) Handbook (3rd edn), p 22; SRA 
(Solicitors Regulation Authority) (2017) SRA Handbook (Version 19). For 
an example of a recent technology-led amendment, see Bar Standards 
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THREE
The tribunals gamble
As the role of technology steadily grows in justice systems around 
the world,1 the UK Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and HMCTS have 
taken the step of being global pioneers.2 They are now in the 
process of putting many court and tribunal processes – as well as 
court administration systems – on to a digital footing. Tribunals 
– which hear many more challenges to the decisions of public 
authorities than the courts do via judicial review – are a major 
focus of these changes.3 Reforms to tribunals are expected 
to involve tribunal appeals being lodged, and potentially 
determined, online, with the idea of parties coming into contact 
with each other and a judge at an earlier stage than before. The 
spur for these changes is a government drive to cut the running 
1 See, for example, Katsh, Ethan and Rabinovich-Einy, Orna (2017) Digital 
Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Barton, Benjamin H. and Bibas, 
Stephanos (2017) Rebooting Justice, New York: Encounter Books.
2 For an overview of the entire reform project, see Rozenberg, Joshua (2018) 
The Online Court: Will IT Work?, Guildford: Legal Education Foundation.
3 Ministry of Justice (2016) Transforming Our Justice System, London, p 15. 
My focus here excludes party-to-party tribunals, such as the Employment 
Tribunal – the focus is solely on claims concerning administrative decisions.
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costs of the justice system.4 As such, new online procedures are 
being coupled with court closures and significant reductions 
in the amount of court staff.5 While there is hope that online 
processes may increase access to justice for many, there is also 
concern that some may be digitally excluded from justice. At the 
same time, there is a worry that new online processes will not 
compensate adequately for reduced service provision in respect 
of traditional processes. Overall, these reforms represent a major 
policy gamble by a government under pressure to reduce costs: 
the gamble that technology-based solutions can provide more 
access to justice for significantly less money.
Tribunal reform is starting in the Social Security and Child 
Support Tribunal (SSCS) and then moving on to the First-tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) Chamber (FtTIAC).6 This 
chapter starts by looking at the role of tribunals in those two 
contexts. In particular, it is highlighted how the role of tribunals 
within the wider administrative justice landscape has been 
significantly reduced in recent years. I then explain different 
stances – from the enthusiastic to the cynical – on the reforms, 
before explaining how online processes are likely to change the 
face of the traditional model of tribunals that many are familiar 
with at present. The final part of the chapter considers some 
of the key design issues arising as part of these reforms, before 
offering some recommendations on the ongoing reform process. 
Development of online tribunals
As outlined in Chapter Two, there has been a significant 
reduction in the amount of public money that the government 
4 Ryder, Ernest (2018) ‘Assisting Access to Justice’, University of Keele.
5 National Audit Office (2018) Early Progress in Transforming Courts and 
Tribunals, HC 1001, Session 2017–2019; House of Commons Committee 
of Public Accounts (2018) Transforming Courts and Tribunals, HC 976.
6 HM Courts & Tribunals Service (2018) Reform Update: Autumn 2018.
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is willing to spend on the justice system since 2010. There is 
now a wide concern that the justice system is under-funded, and 
this has carried the consequence of substantially reduced access 
to justice for many people, particularly those without means 
and those who are vulnerable.7 The court and tribunal reform 
programme has been developed in response to these budget cuts 
and austerity more broadly. This modernisation programme 
– which covers a wide variety of reforms – aims to redesign 
and modernise the way in which people can access courts and 
tribunals by introducing online and digital processes. It also 
seeks to create efficiencies by moving a paper-heavy system 
of administration on to a new digital basis. The pressure from 
the Treasury to reduce spending looms large over the reforms.
The reform programme was announced in September 2016 in 
a joint vision statement entitled Transforming Our Justice System, 
published in the joint names of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord 
Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals.8 This paper 
highlights the need for radical reform required to modernise 
and upgrade the justice system through technology. It states that 
there is a compelling case for reform of tribunals:
Tribunals will be digital by default, with easy to use and 
intuitive online processes put in place to help people lodge 
a claim more easily, but with the right levels of help in 
place for anyone who needs it, making sure that nobody 
is denied justice.9
The idea is that tribunal users will be placed at the heart 
of the system, and tribunal judges and members will move 
towards a more inquisitorial and problem-solving approach. 
7 See, for example, JUSTICE (2015) Delivering Justice in an Age of Austerity.
8 Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals 
(2016) Transforming Our Justice System, Ministry of Justice.
9 Ibid, p 15.
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Documents relevant to appeals can be shared via E-platforms, 
cutting administration costs and delay – allowing appeals to be 
determined or otherwise resolved quicker than is possible in any 
paper-based system. It is also said that there will be the adoption 
of ‘continuous online hearings’, where judges are involved much 
sooner in appeals, are enabled to oversee evidence assimilation 
and are put in a position to make decisions at an earlier stage 
in an appeal process where possible. This was the broad vision 
that served as the starting point: it was light on detail but heavy 
on ambition.
There are a wide variety of tribunals and they operate in 
very different contexts – applying different law, dealing with 
different government bodies, possessing particular cultures of 
adjudication etc. The Transforming Our Justice System paper told 
us that online appeals processes would be trialled in SSCS. This 
being the largest tribunal jurisdiction and one where appellants 
have a wide variety of complex needs, there was a ‘if we can do 
it there, we can do it anywhere’ spirit adopted. FtTIAC would 
be next in the queue. Beyond this, however, little was known 
about how the reforms would be implemented and what online 
appeals processes would look like. Even at the time of writing, 
the full details are yet to emerge (2019). It is still important 
to understand the context in which tribunals have operated 
to grasp the potential implications of digitalisation, whatever 
form it takes. Here, I focus on the recent context of two of the 
largest tribunals, which are also the first two to be put online: 
SSCS and FtTIAC.
Social security policy is administered by officials within 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), who take 
approximately 12 million decisions each year to determine 
whether or not claimants are eligible for benefits. The two 
benefits with the largest number of claimants are Employment 
and Support Allowance (ESA) and Personal Independence 
Payments (PIPs). After a claim is made, an assessment will be 
undertaken, usually involving a ‘healthcare professional’ who 
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is employed by a private provider under contract with the 
DWP.10 Some decisions are refused and some of those refusals 
are disputed by claimants through mandatory reconsideration 
(MR) (around 300,000 per year) and tribunal appeals (around 
150,000 per year).
There are often concerns with the quality of both the 
decision process as well as the adverse outcomes for the 
individuals concerned. In relation to initial decision-making 
processes and assessments, the contracting out of assessments 
to private companies, such as ATOS and Maximus, has been 
widely criticised.11 Criticism of initial decision-making has also 
emerged from the senior judiciary. Sir Ernest Ryder, Senior 
President of Tribunals, has stated that most appeals are based on 
bad decisions.12 He found that the quality of evidence offered 
by the DWP at tribunals would often be ‘wholly inadmissible’ in 
any other court, and that 60% of cases were ‘no-brainers’ where 
there was nothing in the law or facts that would make the DWP 
win. This, the Senior President argued, meant poor decision-
making led to ‘an inappropriate use of judicial resources, it’s an 
inappropriate experience for the users, and the cost is simply 
not right.’ The DWP has defended its decision-making, and 
regularly attributes decisions overturned at appeal to new 
evidence – which was not before them – being presented at 
the tribunal. There have also been legal challenges to benefits 
decision-making. In 2017, the Administrative Court quashed 
a regulation relating to PIP decision-making on the basis that 
10 For a general discussion, see Thomas, Robert and Tomlinson, Joe (2017) 
‘Mapping current issues in administrative justice: Austerity and the “more 
bureaucratic rationality” approach’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family 
Law, 39(3), 380–99, pp 396–7.
11 House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2018) PIP and ESA 
Assessments, HC 829 2017-19.
12 Dugan, Emily (2017) ‘A senior judge has suggested charging the government 




it was discriminatory.13 In response, the DWP decided not to 
appeal the judgment and to review the case of every person 
receiving PIP – a total of some 1.6 million individuals.
In 2013, the DWP also introduced MR to resolve disputes 
before they reach tribunals.14 The justification was to resolve 
disputes quickly and to reduce the volume of tribunal appeals.15 
Claimants can no longer appeal directly to a tribunal, but must 
first request a MR.16 Between 2013 and 2017, some 1.5 million 
MRs were decided. It transpired that MR was, in practice, very 
quick: average monthly clearance times did not go above 20 
days.17 However, MR has been criticised on various grounds. 
It has been suggested that it discourages many people from 
pursuing their claims before tribunals. There has been a steep 
drop in the volume of appeals lodged since the introduction of 
MR. In 2014/15, appeal numbers were 73% lower compared 
with 2013/14.18 MR was intended as a filter, but the concern 
has been that many cases that could succeed before tribunals fall 
13 R. (on the application of RF) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2017] EWHC 3375 (Admin). The regulation in question was the Social 
Security (Personal Independence Payment) (Amendment) Regulations 2017, 
Reg 2(4).
14 It has been estimated that this review could cost £3.7 billion by 2023; 
see BBC News (2018) ‘Personal independence payments: All 1.6 million 
claims to be reviewed’, 30 January.
15 DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2012) Mandatory Consideration 
of Revision Before Appeal, London.
16 Welfare Reform Act 2012, Section 102; The Universal Credit, Personal 
Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and 
Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations SI 2013/381. 
A concurrent change was that whereas previously claimants lodged their 
appeals with the DWP, appeals are now lodged directly with the tribunal.
17 DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2017) Employment and Support 
Allowance: Work Capability Assessments, Mandatory reconsiderations and 
appeals, London, September, p 7.
18 The subsequent increase is largely accounted for by appeals lodged by 
claimants being transferred from Disability Living Allowance to Personal 
Independence Payments.
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away after the MR stage. This creates the impression that the 
DWP is gatekeeping the tribunals system and taking advantage 
of claimant fatigue.19 Particular concerns have often arisen due 
to the effect of MR on the behaviour of vulnerable claimants. 
Among the specific worries are that MR decision notices 
often simply restate the same reasons as were given for the 
initial decision without further detail, that the decision-making 
process is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ exercise, that tribunals often 
reach very different conclusions to the MR process, and that 
officials conducting MRs prefer the evidence of a contracted-in 
assessor to other legitimate medical evidence.20 Such concerns 
are underscored by the fact that MR has the lowest satisfaction 
rating of any part of the DWP process, and that there have been 
much lower success rates for claimants in MR compared with 
tribunal appeals.21 From 2013 to 2016 there were some one 
million MR decisions, with 17% being decided in favour of 
the claimant. Appeals success rates have, by comparison, been 
around 40%, rising to 65% in recent years.
It is within this changing context of social security adjudication 
that online tribunals are being introduced by HMCTS. The 
task of creating an effective online process for social security 
tribunals also engages a challenging demographic context. Many 
appellants are vulnerable and have physical and mental health 
19 A previous empirical study found that local authority officers could use 
administrative review to control claimants’ access to tribunals; see Eardley, 
Tony and Sainsbury, Roy (1993) ‘Managing appeals: The control of Housing 
Benefit internal reviews by local authority officers’, Journal of Social Policy, 
22(4), 461–85. Other evidence suggests that claimant fatigue often 
discourages people from challenging decisions; see Cowan, David and 
Halliday, Simon (2003) The Appeal of Internal Review: Law, Administrative 
Justice, and the (Non-)Emergence of Disputes, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp 
138–40. 
20 Social Security Advisory Committee (2016) Decision Making and Mandatory 
Reconsideration.
21 DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) (2016) DWP Claimant Service 
and Experience Survey 2014/15, p 85.
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issues. Furthermore, although the fiscal value of disputes in the 
tribunal may seem small, for many claimants the implications of 
appeals affect their living arrangements significantly.
Similar trends are visible in recent developments in the 
FtTIAC, including concerns about the quality of initial decision-
making in the Home Office. In terms of the number of appeals 
that the FtTIAC receives, it has the second highest number 
of receipts of any First-tier Tribunal (SSCS being the largest 
tribunal jurisdiction). However, there has been a dramatic drop 
in the total number of appeals being lodged in the tribunal in 
recent years. In the first quarter of 2009/10, the FtTIAC received 
a total of 43,750 receipts. This decreased to just 11,864 receipts 
in the first quarter of the year 2018/19, representing a decrease 
of almost 73% in the total number of receipts of appeals received 
by the tribunal over that period.
Several factors may be in play in relation to the rapid decrease 
in the volume of appeals, and the trend is best explained by 
reference to a combination of them. However, the most obvious 
and main explanation is the systematic removal of appeal rights 
in certain categories of immigration decisions.22 In 2014, 
immigration appeal rights (except those relating to asylum 
and human rights grounds) were replaced with a system of 
administrative review. The significant reduction in the tribunal’s 
workload is the policy working as intended. The key motivation 
of the policy is that high success rates in tribunal appeals and 
their inconvenience to efficient administration both incurred 
costs and frustrated political ends.
The substitution of appeals to the tribunal for administrative 
review can cynically be viewed as limiting access to effective 
22 Immigration Act 2014, Section 15; Immigration Rules, Appendix AR. Family 
visitor appeals were abolished in 2013: Crime and Courts Act 2013, Section 
52. 
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administrative redress as a mechanism for immigration control.23 
A more sympathetic interpretation would perhaps contend that 
administrative review is quicker and easier for immigration 
applicants compared to a tribunal appeal, and that as a process 
internal to administration, administrative review provides a 
better opportunity for the Home Office to systematically 
improve the quality of all decisions. While it is true that users 
may want quick and easy decisions,24 and it is also true that 
administrative review is quick (typically a matter of a weeks), 
it would be naïve to see the preference for, and expansion of, 
administrative review within the context of immigration redress 
as simply a policy that promotes the interests of the applicants 
or efficient administration. There is a strong and well-founded 
concern that administrative reviews ‘are neither independent 
nor transparent, but merely involve a different caseworker taking 
another look at the papers.’25 Furthermore, within the context 
of immigration and asylum, the use of internal review processes 
has routinely been criticised as ‘superficial’ and ‘ineffective’ by 
oversight bodies, including by a parliamentary committee.26 
As regards the new system of administrative review, the 
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration 
concluded, in his first report on the system, that low-level, 
untrained and temporary staff with limited or no experience of 
23 Thomas, Robert (2016) ‘Immigration and Access to Justice’, in Ellie Palmer, 
Tom Cornford, Audrey Guinchard and Yseult Marique (eds) Access to Justice: 
Beyond the Policies and Politics of Austerity, Oxford: Hart Publishing, p 127, 
which speculates on the possibility of ‘the end of appeals’ in immigration 
redress.
24 Berthoud, Richard and Bryson, Alex (1997) ‘Social security appeals: What do 
the claimants want?’, Journal of Social Security Law, 4, 17–41; Richardson, 
Genevra and Genn, Hazel (2007) ‘Tribunals in transition’, Public Law, 116.
25 Thomas, p 126 (note 23 above).
26 See, for example, House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee 




immigration law were undertaking reviews.27 At the same time, 
there was little oversight of these officials. Some less good review 
decisions demonstrated ‘an over-reliance on the initial refusal 
decision letter.’28 The reasoning of decisions was often brief 
and underdeveloped.29 And unlike appeals before the FtTIAC, 
new evidence cannot be taken into account in a review.30 This 
unresponsiveness is unsatisfactory in a context like immigration 
and asylum where there is a high possibility of the circumstances 
of an applicant changing between the initial adverse decision 
and the subsequent appeal or review.
As for the tribunal itself, recent years have been characterised 
by delays and high success rates. The length of time it takes 
to get an appeal decided is an important element of access to 
justice. One of the possible strengths of tribunals, relative to 
ordinary courts, is their potential to dispose of cases quickly. 
Across the tribunal, between the first and third quarter of 
2017/18, the average age of an appeal at the time at which it 
is disposed exceeded, and stayed above, the 50-week threshold 
for those three quarters. The clear trend in the tribunal in 
recent years is towards longer waiting times. There are various 
possible explanations for why this is the case. It could be that 
there are more complex cases coming before the tribunal, but 
there appears to be no reason to think that appeals have become 
significantly more complex. Litigation behaviour could be 
changing. A possible decrease in representation may also be a 
factor. Equally, workload changes in the tribunals can be hard 
to predict, and ensuring there are sufficient judicial resource to 
27 ICIBI (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration) (2016) 
An Inspection of the Administrative Review Processes Introduced Following 
the Immigration Act 2014. See also ICIBI (2017) A Re-inspection of the 
Administrative Review Process.
28 Ibid, para 2.10.
29 R (Akturk) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 4 WLR 
62, [47] (Holamn J). 
30 Immigration Rules, Appendix AR [2.4].
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meet demand can be difficult. Whatever the explanation, it is 
remarkable that during a period in which the number of appeals 
has dropped, the amount of time taken to decide appeals has 
increased substantially.
Success rates in the tribunal remain high and appear to be 
increasing further – close to 50% across the jurisdiction. The 
present success rates in the FtTIAC essentially create a situation 
where getting a tribunal hearing means that the chances of a 
favourable decision are almost 50/50. It is difficult to infer too 
much from basic outcomes data, but it likely shows that errors 
in Home Office decision-making are not uncommon. However, 
success rates could be explained by reference to tribunals having 
more evidence than initial decision-makers, or other differences 
in the two decision-making processes. Any blanket claim that 
all successful appeals reveal an avoidable mistake by the Home 
Office would therefore be incorrect. What is perhaps more 
noteworthy is the vast difference in success rates between 
administrative review and tribunal appeals. Under the old system, 
around 49% of appeals were successful, whereas in 2015/16, the 
success rate for administrative reviews conducted in the UK was 
8%, falling to just 3.4% the year after.31
In a further reform with implications for the tribunal, there 
has been the introduction of the so-called ‘deport first, appeal 
later’ policy in human rights and asylum appeals. Provisions in 
the Immigration Act 2014 gave the Home Office the power 
to deport foreign nationals with criminal convictions without 
allowing them to appeal the deportation in the UK.32 The 
Immigration Act 2016 then widened these powers to affect all 
31 For detailed analysis of recent evidence and data, see Thomas, Robert and 
Tomlinson, Joe (2019: forthcoming) ‘A different tale of judicial power: 
Administrative review as a problematic response to the judicialisation of 
tribunals’, Public Law.
32 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Section 94B, an amendment 
introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, Section 17(3). 
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migrants wishing to appeal on human rights grounds.33 If an 
out-of-country appeal succeeds, the appellant may be able to 
return to the UK. Out-of-country appeals allow for speedier 
deportations and reduce the amount of detained immigration 
applicants. This reduces costs for the state. At the same time, 
the geographic separation of the applicant from the tribunal has 
a number of important consequences. Applicants are less likely 
to appeal. Establishing access to a tribunal may prove difficult 
from certain locations, including because of the expense of 
realising the right to appeal. It could also be more difficult to 
find and secure representation. For video-linked out-of-country 
appeal hearings, the hearing will be qualitatively different from 
a traditional oral hearing. Furthermore, it is highly likely that 
the applicant would have already experienced material harm 
from the administrative error as a consequence of the act of 
deportation. For example, the applicant may experience loss 
of employment or suffer detriment through remoteness from 
relations in the UK. Since the expansion of this policy, the 
Supreme Court has held that the out-of-country appeals process 
can be effectively fair for human rights purposes in the context 
of general criminal deportations.34 However, if an appeal from 
abroad is not effective, then the public interest in removal would 
be outweighed and an application should not be certified.35
Overall, the move to online tribunals has to be understood as 
part of a series of important changes in recent years. Reforms 
have, broadly, led to tribunals having a diminished role within 
the wider system of administrative justice. This provides the 
context in which a politics around online tribunals has emerged.
33 Immigration Act 2016, Section 63. 
34 R (on the application of Kiarie) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2017] 1 WLR 2380. 
35 In a recent case, the Upper Tribunal gave guidance on the questions to be 
addressed in this respect; see AJ (s 94B: Kiarie and Byndloss questions) 
Nigeria [2018] UKUT 115 (IAC); [2018] Imm AR 976.
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Politics of online tribunals
The politics of online tribunals largely spans a spectrum from 
cynics to enthusiasts. The core question in the digitalisation of 
tribunals is whether the reforms will, in time, improve both 
access to and the quality of administrative justice, or leave 
citizens in a worse-off position. Many hold strong views on 
the use of technology in the justice system, but great caution 
is required here: there is very little evidence on the impact of 
digital procedures in public justice systems, and many views are 
therefore heavily grounded in speculation. To think about the 
emerging politics around these reforms, it is helpful to imagine 
two broad views on the prospects of digitalisation: one where 
traditional tribunal justice is enhanced and another where 
digitalisation is just another step toward a weakened tribunal 
system. There are, of course, many increments between these 
two positions, but most commentators tend to lean towards one 
or the other viewpoint.
For the digitalisation enthusiasts, the prospect of online 
appeals presents the opportunity to resolve easy cases quickly 
and, in doing so, to reduce stress caused to appellants who 
are currently forced to endure long waiting times ahead 
of hearings. Digitalisation could also reduce the cost of 
administering tribunal appeals and reduce backlogs that build 
up over time. Evidence may be easy to submit and assimilate 
for both appellants and government bodies, while being easier 
to manage for judges. Communication about evidence between 
all parties could also be quicker, cheaper and more convenient. 
Appellants could save money by not travelling and taking time 
out of work, while government can save administration costs. 
Technology could also permit judicial resources to be flexibly 
deployed – allowing judges to work as efficiently as possible, in 
a way that most adds value to an appeal. It may even transpire 
that online appeals are cheaper than internal review systems and 
may make use of the tribunals appeals system more attractive 
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to government departments. In redesigning tribunal processes 
for digitalisation, there is also the opportunity to do away with 
needless complexity and to provide accessible online processes. 
Online processes may be less intimidating for appellants. With 
the use of assisted digital services, there could be the creation 
of a wider support environment around tribunals that may not 
be present in the current process.36
At the other end of the optimism spectrum, a cynic may view 
the digitalisation of tribunals as having numerous significant 
pitfalls that could weaken administrative justice. At a basic level, 
it may be thought that hearings will not be as effective when 
managed online. They could, for instance, not be developed 
in a way that makes them useful for making (often complex) 
decisions of law and fact.37 This could lead to more mistakes 
that have serious effects on the lives of citizens. There is also 
the risk that online appeals will lead to lower success rates 
than traditional appeals. Success rates between paper and 
oral appeals differ significantly, and online appeals could have 
similar consequences.38 Use of video links and other remote 
communication methods may see appellants not participate 
36 Ministry of Justice (2017) Transforming Our Justice System: Assisted Digital 
Strategy, Automatic Online Conviction and Statutory Standard Penalty, and 
Panel Composition in Tribunals: Government Response. The government 
has contracted this job out to the Good Things Foundation. For the context 
on assisted digital, see JUSTICE (2018) Preventing Digital Exclusion from 
Online Justice. 
37 See the comments, for instance, in R (Mohibullah) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2016] UKUT 561 (IAC) at [90]; R (Kiarie and 
Byndloss) (n 63) at [67]; and Secretary of State for the Home Department 
v Nare (evidence by electronic means) Zimbabwe [2011] UKUT 00443 
(IAC) [17].
38 For a discussion, see Thomas, Cheryl and Genn, Hazel (2013) Understanding 
Tribunal Decision-making: A Foundational Empirical Study, London: Nuffield 
Foundation.
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as effectively in their cases.39 At the same time, despite the 
possibility of savings through digitalisation, costs may ultimately 
rise overall. For appellants, they may, for instance, have to 
visit assisted digital centres multiple times. For those using a 
traditional oral hearing, journey times and costs may be increased 
by hearing centre closures. For government, if many appellants 
do not make use of the new online process, they may not see 
significant cost savings. Instead, there may just be another appeal 
mode with additional running costs incurred. Online appeals, 
hosted on the gov.uk website, may also risk losing the appearance 
of independence from the government departments that are 
the subject of appeals. In relation to assisted digital services, the 
uptake could be low or they could provide another gap in the 
tribunal appeal process where meritorious appeals fall out of 
the system. There is also the possibility that ‘digital assistance’ 
strays into giving inappropriate and unregulated legal advice.40
A new model of tribunal justice
The full details of online appeal procedures across different 
tribunal jurisdictions are yet to be seen. Moreover, the impacts of 
digitalisation will not be known without rigorous and extensive 
empirical research. However, on the basis of what is known so 
far, it is clear that digitalisation will see the creation of a new 
online model of tribunal which will, at first at least, sit alongside 
the present traditional model.41
39 Federman, Mark (2006) ‘On the media effects of immigration and Refugee 
Board hearings via videoconference’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 19(4), 
433; Eagly, Ingrid V. (2015) ‘Remote adjudication in immigration’, 
Northwestern University Law Review, 109(4), 933–1019.
40 See the concerns set out in JUSTICE (2018) Immigration and Asylum 
Appeals – A Fresh Look, London: JUSTICE.
41  For a fuller analysis of the changing models of tribunals in the UK, see 
Thomas, Robert (2017) ‘Current Developments in UK Tribunals: Challenges 
for Administrative Justice’, in Sarah Nason (ed) Administrative Justice in 
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The traditional model of tribunals has certain features that can 
be contrasted with the likely post-digitalisation model. The first 
obvious feature to note is that, at present, tribunals and their 
administration are paper-heavy. Some appeals are determined 
via an oral hearing, where appellants can put their case and 
judges can ask questions, and some are determined by a judge 
reviewing papers and evidence. Parties correspond over evidence 
– which, including between HMCTS and government bodies, 
is shared manually. A second key feature is that the process is 
designed around the hearing or determination. Evidence is 
gathered in time for the determination and the determination 
is then made in a form of a – typically very short – binding 
decision. Although there are important differences of detail, 
this is the broad traditional model of tribunal operating in SSCS 
and FtTIAC.
The traditional model of tribunals is now firmly established 
within the legal system. It has been broadly successful in dealing 
with a large caseload in a just and proportionate manner. It does, 
however, have multiple limitations. As the traditional model 
is designed around the formal determination, anticipation for 
the hearing can create stress for appellants over long periods 
of time. For cases with clear problems in the decision being 
appealed, this seems unnecessary. All of this can make tribunal 
appeals inefficient and inconvenient. There is typically little or 
no communication between the parties before the hearing. The 
hearing will usually be the first and only opportunity for the 
parties to exchange views and engage with the tribunal. Given 
the volume of cases and the need to list oral hearings, appeals 
can take some time to be heard and decided. For instance, in 
2017, social security appeals took on average 20 weeks to be 
Wales and Comparative Perspectives, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
Chapter 7.
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decided whereas immigration appeals took 51 weeks.42 Many 
weeks of ‘downtime’ pass in which nothing is happening to an 
appeal other than delay. A major issue for many appellants is not 
knowing how their appeal is progressing through the tribunal 
process. Weeks can go by without any sort of update. The 
consequent risk is that claimants disengage, miss deadlines or do 
not turn up to their hearings. This can lead to adjournments and 
further delays, which can further increase stress and anxiety for 
appellants.43Another drawback is that the demand on HMCTS 
to manage an enormous number of paper files by itself generates 
complications, such as lost and mislaid documents, thereby 
prompting complaints.44 
The new online model moves away from the traditional model 
in a range of important ways – offering features that may offset 
some of the main limitations of the traditional model. Instead 
of paper-based appeals, appeals will originate online. The 
internal tribunal processes will also be based on automatically 
shared paperwork. These new processes will likely extend to 
the government departments that are the subject of the appeal, 
making information-sharing and hearing preparation quickly. 
As part of the move to a digital system, users will get updates 
via SMS and email on the progress of their appeal. All online 
processes and updates will use non-legal language. Perhaps 
the most significant change in the model will be the move to 
continuous online dispute resolution. As outlined above, this 
aims to bring all of the parties to an appeal as early as possible,45 
42 Ministry of Justice (2017) Tribunals and Gender Recognition Statistics 
Quarterly, April to June 2017, Table T3.
43 Marchant, Robin (2017) ‘Sometimes it makes sense to start in the middle’, 
Inside HMCTS, 3 February.
44 Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman (2016) Complaints about UK 
Government Departments and Agencies, and Some UK Public Organisations 
2015–16, p 17.
45 This model has been pioneered by the Traffic Penalty Tribunal and is to 
be piloted in social security appeals. The Traffic Penalty Tribunal also uses 
telephone hearings and, to a lesser degree, traditional physical hearings.
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allowing the key issues to be identified quickly and for ‘easy’ 
cases to be determined without the need to wait for a traditional 
hearing. This removes the ‘hearing-centric’ component of the 
traditional tribunal model, replacing it with a more conversation 
mode of decision-making that allows the parties to informally 
consider issues.
How the new online model of tribunals will work in practice 
is presently unclear and it will likely vary across different tribunal 
jurisdictions. What is clear is that operationalising this new 
model of tribunals presents multiple important questions of 
design. The next part of this chapter turns to map some of the 
key design issues.
Key design issues
As online tribunal processes are still in development, it is not yet 
possible to map the issues that have arisen with their design. It is 
possible, however, to highlight some of the key issues arising in 
the ongoing design process. I cover eight of the most important 
issues here.
First, there is the question of which appeals should be 
channelled through online processes and which should not. 
Are there some types of cases that would not be appropriate 
for online dispute resolution? If so, which types of cases? How 
precisely would those cases be identified? Through a blanket 
policy or on a case-by-case basis? What approach will be taken 
when cases raise issues of the appellant’s credibility? It is clear, 
and the government understands, that many cases will simply 
not be suitable for online procedures. It is also suggested by the 
government that appellant consent to use of online processes 
will be a key principle, and that appellants will not be forced 
into online processes. How and when such channelling decisions 
are made will be an essential design question.
Second, there is the key design issue of how traditional 
values of legal process and good administration – such as 
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transparency, fairness, participation, judicial independence 
and open justice – are transferred to the digital sphere.46 How 
will these values be effectively respected in the digital sphere? 
For instance, how will the value of open justice be secured 
through an online process? These values – loaded with varied 
concerns and preferences about what a good justice system 
looks like – will animate views on online appeals, and process 
designs must consider them and develop appropriate responses. 
This may raise some difficult trade-offs between different value 
preferences, but also straightforwardly tricky questions of how to 
operationalise certain values in the digital context. For instance, 
the implementation of effective open justice in an online tribunal 
process will require practical design innovation.47
Third, there is the design of communication platforms. It is 
expected that online messaging systems will be used. Experience 
in the Traffic Penalty Tribunal – an early pioneer of online 
appeals – has found that online messaging has considerable 
advantages in terms of quickly narrowing down the issues and 
enabling a focused exchange of views. Online messaging can 
significantly lower the costs, delays and constraints that come 
with physical hearings. Having all the information and evidence 
together in a single online file as opposed to a paper-based file 
makes it far more easily accessible. An online system could also 
widen the accessibility of the tribunal process. It is envisaged that 
continuous online hearings will radically reduce the length of 
the appeals process in most cases, from an average of 20 weeks 
to one to two weeks. However, it is yet to be seen the extent 
46 For a discussion of administrative justice values, see Partington, Martin 
(1999) ‘Restructuring administrative justice? The redress of citizens’ 
grievances’, Current Legal Problems, 53, 173; Tomlinson, Joe (2017) ‘The 
grammar of administrative justice values’, Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law, 39(4), 524–37.
47 Prince, Sue (2019) ‘“Fine words butter no parsnips”: Can the principle 




to which appellants in jurisdictions such as SSCS and FtTIAC 
are able to effectively use such a platform. Another related 
issue is how video-link communication is implemented fairly.48 
Tribunals spend most of their time looking at evidence trying to 
establish facts. There is a widely held assumption that this task is 
best undertaken by hearing the evidence in person through an 
oral hearing.49 This may be because other means of providing 
oral evidence may be inadequate and thereby risk unfairness for 
appellants or reduce the ability of the other parties to test such 
evidence. It could also be because the judicial task of collecting 
and evaluating facts – especially the credibility of a witness – will 
often depend not just on the content of the oral evidence, but 
also on non-verbal forms of communication, such as the way 
in which the evidence has been presented and the appellant’s 
demeanour.50 Alternatively, there are the ways in which live 
evidence at an oral hearing is subject to a degree of formality 
and supervision by the tribunal. The tribunal can control the 
procedure to ensure that there is no misuse of the judicial process. 
At the same time, video-link hearings have been used for some 
time in social security, immigration bail hearings and Upper 
Tribunal error of law hearings. Other jurisdictions, such as in 
the US and Canada, have made increasing use of video links for 
live evidence.51 Furthermore, using video links in error of law 
hearings is relatively uncontroversial because the proceedings 
typically take the form of a dialogue or conversation between 
representatives and the judge, with the appellant making little, 
if any, active contribution. How video-link hearings can be 
48 For recent government testing on this, see Rossner, Meredith and McCurdy, 
Martha (2018) Implementing Video hearings (Party-to-State): A Process 
Evaluation, London: HM Courts & Tribunals Service.
49 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Nare (evidence by electronic 
means) Zimbabwe [2011] UKUT 00443 (IAC), [17].
50 R (Mohibullah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKUT 
561 (IAC), [90].
51 Federman (note 39 above); Eagly (note 39 above).
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effective in tribunals that have an important fact-finding function 
presents a design challenge: the need to develop platforms where 
evidence can be given effectively and in a way that judges can 
have confidence in.
Fourth, and linked to the questions of the implementation 
of traditional values and effective communication between 
parties, there are multiple design questions concerning how fair 
procedures are ensured in online tribunals.52 The online process 
promises huge changes in the tribunal process. This raises a host 
of questions. As noted above, one prominent example is the 
possible use of video-link technology in evidence-gathering. 
There is a range of questions about how these developments 
may be seen through the prism of the legal principles of 
procedural fairness, as well as how the use of technology 
may impact claimants’ perceived sense of procedural justice.53 
Beyond what is legally considered to be procedurally fair, there 
is an important ‘human element’ in play here. The physical 
architecture of a courtroom, for example, can often condition 
people’s experiences and perceptions of their treatment.54 How 
online processes can be designed to maintain and maybe even 
enhance procedural fairness – both in the legal sense and the 
perception of appellants – presents varied design issues. 
Fifth, there is the issue of how online processes – and 
surrounding systems – are designed to ensure appellants are 
not digitally excluded. While some appellants may find online 
processes more accessible, some groups are either unable or 
unwilling to use the internet for important issues such as a 
52 In legal terms, it is important to keep in mind the common law principles 
of procedural fairness and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
53 For an example in a different context, see Wells, Helen (2008) ‘The techno-
fix versus the fair cop: Procedural (in)justice and automated speed limit 
enforcement’, The British Journal of Criminology, 48(6), 798–817.
54 Mulcahy, Linda (2010) Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the 
Place of Law, Abingdon: Routledge.
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tribunal case. Some people cannot afford internet access (or good 
internet access).55 Some of those people may have access at a 
library or some other place, but their access – in terms of privacy, 
time and convenience – is likely to be less than those who have 
their own at-home connection. Beyond this, connection quality 
and coverage varies drastically across the UK.56 Some people 
quite reasonably may not wish to have an important matter such 
as their entitlement to social security benefits or immigration 
determined online. The MoJ and HMCTS have recognised the 
need to support people who have difficulty using technology, 
particularly older people, children, people with disabilities, those 
without digital skills and those with poor literacy or English 
skills. In February 2017, the MoJ published its general approach 
to ‘assisted digital’ services. It promised support for people who 
have trouble with using technology: ‘we will ensure that our 
assisted digital support takes into account the needs of those 
who are elderly or have disabilities, those with poor literacy or 
English skills, and those who lack access to technology because 
of cost or geography.’57 The stated intention is to ensure that 
assisted digital services are designed to meet the needs of the 
end user of a digital service, mainly unrepresented appellants, 
litigants in person and professional users. An ‘assisted digital’ 
support programme is being developed to help those who need 
support to use online systems. There is a team within HMCTS 
investigating this issue and piloting new processes. This involves 
55 In 2015, of the 14% of households in Great Britain with no internet access, 
some explained this on the basis of equipment costs being too high (14%) 
and access costs being too high (12%); see ONS (Office for National 
Statistics) (2015) ‘Statistical bulletin: Internet access – Households and 
individuals’.
56 British Infrastructure Group (2016) Broadband: A New Study into Broadband 
Investment and the Role of BT and Openreach.
57 Ministry of Justice (2017) Transforming Our Justice System: Assisted Digital 
Strategy, Automatic Online Conviction and Statutory Standard Penalty, and 
Panel Composition in Tribunals: Government Response, p 11. 
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government working with an independent, contracted-in 
supplier with the aim of providing a network of accessible 
assistance. It is expected that ‘[t]elephone and webchat services 
will also be available and clearly signposted for those who already 
have access to IT but require extra support, and paper channels 
will be maintained for those who need them.’58 How appellants 
at risk of digital exclusion are managed appropriately and fairly, 
without undermining the wider purposes of digitalisation, 
will require appeal and assisted digital processes to be carefully 
designed.
Sixth, online appeals must be designed to fit into the wider 
administrative justice landscape. Administrative justice is both a 
fragmented and integrated landscape. It is comprised of a range 
of different systems (internal review, tribunals, judicial review) 
and different policy areas (social security, immigration, tax). 
Changes to one part of the wider landscape can have implications 
for another part. The introduction of digital tribunals prompts 
multiple questions in this respect. For instance, in the context 
of social security, there is a possibility that – next to an online 
tribunal procedure – MR looks obsolete. How will the two 
systems – one paper-based and the other online – work 
together? Good online tribunals designs would be sensitive to 
the wider administrative justice system in which they exist, 
such as processes like MR. There is plenty of room for creative 
improvements here too. It is widely argued that government 
should learn from tribunal decisions to improve initial decision-
making.59 The prospect of digitalisation presents the opportunity 
to build in better and quicker feedback loops that consume less 
time, effort and money. 
Seventh, there is the question of data collection. Digital 
systems collect massive amounts of data. They can do this 
58 Ibid, p 27.
59 See, generally, Thomas, Robert (2015) ‘Administrative justice, better 
decisions, and organisational learning’, Public Law, 111.
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consciously through, for instance, asking for specific information 
on a form. But digital systems also create data through their 
operation (often in the form of metadata). Digitalising a tribunals 
system historically reliant on paper raises questions in relation 
to data collection and protection. From a research and system 
improvement perspective, there is a potential bounty here too: 
the collection of mass data that is easily searchable opens clear 
gateways for new research, at a much faster rate. What data is 
collected is a central question. So is what data will be published.
Finally, there is the need to design an efficient process. As 
noted at the outset of this chapter, efficiency is a key driver 
in the HMCTS reforms. Technology-based reforms tend to 
be based on the idea of frontloading investment and gaining 
long-term savings. That seems to be the case with Transforming 
Our Justice System too. At the same time, systems often work 
in unpredictable ways and contain hidden costs. If the value 
of efficiency is to be a key driver, we must understand what 
efficiencies are actually generated and at what cost to other 
values, such as access to justice. There is also a need to understand 
false efficiencies. In March 2016 Sir Ernest Ryder explained 
how Money Claims Online:
… has been in operation since 2001 and has over 180,000 
users annually. But once the “submit” button is pressed 
by the user or their representative, a civil servant at the 
other end has to print the e-form, and make up a paper 
file. From that point on, we are back to square one: almost 
back to the Dickensian model of justice via the quill pen.60
There are two major ‘risks’ in respect of efficiency. The first is 
that the online system makes appealing so easy that there is an 
upsurge in cases that cannot be easily handled. The second is 
60 Ryder, Ernest (2016) ‘The Modernisation of Access to Justice in Times of 
Austerity’, The Ryder Lecture, University of Bolton.
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that the use of online systems will not be as broad as is predicted 
as there will be two systems – online and traditional – that 
inefficiently co-exist. This second ‘risk’ may lead to some 
appellants being pressed into using the online tribunal.
I have provided only a broad overview of some key issues that 
designing online tribunal processes presents, yet it is clear that the 
design challenges are many and varied. Digitalisation essentially 
requires us to examine the justice system we have at present and 
to recreate a new system on the basis of what we have learned 
so far. This is no easy task and is made more difficult by the fact 
that seemingly small details may have significant effects on how 
online tribunals operate in practice.
Recommendations
The introduction of online tribunal processes marks another 
key turning point in the long history of tribunals. Digitalisation 
also represents the latest in a number of significant changes 
to tribunals in just recent years. The introduction of online 
tribunals must be understood in the wider context of these 
changes. From that wider perspective, the introduction of online 
tribunals could lead to the continued marginalisation of the role 
of tribunals or go some way to making them more effective as an 
administrative justice process. The outcome of the government’s 
gamble to get more for less by using technology in tribunals will 
only be seen once all of the reforms are completed – something 
that is expected within the next few years.
As there is little in the way of detailed evidence available as 
to how online tribunal appeals will work in practice, the most 
important recommendations that can be offered at this stage go 
to monitoring and design. The issues of design are addressed 
in more detail in the next chapter. As for monitoring of online 
appeals, at least two elements are critical. First, a coherent 
scheme of data collection on online appeals and assisted digital 
– which is in line with data ethics and privacy considerations 
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– must be developed. Furthermore, such data should be made 
publicly available for review by external stakeholders and 
researchers. Second, the government should not only conduct 
research for the development of online processes, but also 
pursue, commission and enable detailed empirical research that 
examines how online processes are working in practice – as part 
of a wider commitment to continued evaluation of new online 
systems. This will provide detailed insights into whether online 
appeals are proving effective or whether they have weakened 
administrative justice in the way some fear they might.
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FOUR
How digital administrative  
justice is made
The recent MoJ and HMCTS digitalisation reforms, discussed in 
Chapter Three, have been developed primarily as an operational 
project. That is to say that, despite the reforms representing 
a major change to justice processes, there is expected to be 
comparatively little by way of substantive changes to the law (at 
least in the foreseeable future). The existing law will instead be 
given new practical enacting frameworks. This approach means 
that responsibility for deliberating on and developing digital 
processes has been left largely with civil servants within HMCTS 
and the MoJ, with Parliament only providing a ‘drip-feed’ of 
legislative activity and oversight thus far.1 Other developments in 
the digitalisation of administrative justice – such as the increasing 
use of automated processes in public sector decision-making – 
1 Rozenberg, Joshua (2018) The Online Court: Will IT Work?, Guildford: Legal 
Education Foundation, p 12. The main legislative activity has focused on 
the Prison and Courts Bill, which has stalled on various occasions. So far 
we only have the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Act 
2018. See also House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2018) 
Transforming Courts and Tribunals, HC 976.
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have seen similar patterns. At the core of the story of how digital 
technology is impacting administrative justice is therefore civil 
servants, their approach to process design and the government’s 
own IT capabilities.2
One key trend in administrative justice design in UK central 
government is that it is increasingly influenced by ‘agile’ or 
‘design-thinking’ approaches.3 This method is underpinning 
how many online administrative justice systems, including online 
tribunals, are being constructed, and is being widely promoted 
by leading technologists in government. Although many lawyers 
will not be familiar with it, design thinking is now a well-
established field of study in its own right. The premise is that 
design as a cognitive process – a ‘more interpretative, intuitive 
mind-set that characterizes the arts and creative professions’4 – 
does not have to focus on products alone but can be extended 
to other fields.5 Design thinking therefore seeks to distil and 
find new applications for design as a way of thinking. Initially 
emerging in the 1960s and 1970s,6 the idea of studying design 
as a mode of thought was developed in the 1980s through to 
the modern day.7 There are long-established journals in the 
field, such as Design Studies and Design Issues. There are also 
many courses available that offer recognised training in this area, 
along with multiple research centres developing new lines of 
2 The key work on the design of administrative justice processes in the UK 
is Le Sueur, Andrew and Bondy, Varda (2012) Designing Redress, London: 
Public Law Project. There is limited literature directly addressing the issue.
3 I use the two terms interchangeably for the purposes of the discussion here.
4 Bason, Christian (2010) Leading Public Sector Innovation: Co-creating for 
a Better Society, Bristol: Policy Press, p 138.
5 Simon, Herbert A. (1969) The Sciences of the Artificial, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
6 Ibid.
7 See, for example, Rowe, Peter G. (1987) Design Thinking, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
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thought.8 There is no precise definition of design thinking or 
the agile method.9 However, the core of the approach appears 
to rest on emphasising the perspective of ‘users’ of systems, 
developing prototype systems and consistently testing systems 
with users.10 These core tenets are commonly expressed in the 
five-part, non-linear design method of:
• empathising with users




Within this framework, multiple tools to support each of 
these exercises have also been developed.12 For instance, the use 
8 For instance, Stanford University now hosts the Legal Design Lab, a 
leading centre. A range of other organisations is working in this space too, 
for example, NuLawLab, Legal Design Jam and Carnegie Mellon’s CyLab 
Usable Privacy & Security Law. The growing literature on the application of 
design thinking to justice is well set out in Ursel, Susan (2017) ‘Building 
better law: How design thinking can help us be better lawyers, meet new 
challenges, and create the future of law’, Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice, 34(1), 28.
9 Kimbell, Lucy (2012) ‘Rethinking design thinking: Part 1’, Design and 
Culture, 3(3), 285–306; Kimbell, Lucy (2012) ‘Rethinking design thinking: 
Part II’, Design and Culture, 4(2), 129–48. See also Dorst, Kees (2011) 
‘The core of “design thinking” and its application’, Design Studies, 32(6), 
521–32; Buchanan, Richard (1992) ‘Wicked problems in design thinking’, 
Design Issues, 8(2), 5–21.
10 Plattner, Hasso, Meinel, Christoph and Leifer, Larry (eds) (2011) Design 
Thinking, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp 14–15.
11 These stages have been expressed in various ways; see, for example, Rowe 
(note 7 above); Simon (note 5 above); Hagan, Margaret (2017) Law by 
Design [E-book]. 
12 Alves, Rui and Nunes, Nuno Jardim (2013) ‘Towards a Taxonomy of 
Service Design Methods and Tools’, in João Falcão e Cunha, Mehdi Snene 
and Henrietta Sampaio da Nóvoa (eds) Exploring Services Science, IESS: 
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of ‘journey-mapping’ tools is now common. These tools help 
system-designers trying to understand how users come to use 
a service and what they experience at each step of the process. 
With the development of the agile approach, its influence has 
grown in many sectors – architecture, business, technology and 
management, to name only a few.13 Law is now one of those 
sectors,14 and so too is administration.15 The agile approach 
International Conference on Exploring Services Science, vol 143, Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer, pp 215–29.
13 See, for example, Brooks Jr, Frederick P. (2010) The Design of Design: Essays 
from a Computer Scientist, Boston, MA: Addison Wesley; Martin, Roger L. 
(2009) Design of Business: Why Design Thinking Is the Next Competitive 
Advantage, Brighton, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
14 Much thinking is taking place on the other side of the Atlantic in particular, 
see Hagan (note 11 above); Hagan, Margaret (2014) ‘Design thinking 
and law: A perfect match’, Law Practice Today, January; Rostain, Tanina, 
Skalbeck, Roger and Mulcahy, Kevin G. (2018) ‘Thinking like a lawyer, 
designing like an architect: Preparing students for the 21st century practice’, 
Chicago- Kent Law Review, 88(3), 743; Owen, Charles L., Staudt, Ronald 
W. and Pedwell, Edward B. (2001) Access to Justice: Meeting the Needs of 
Self represented Litigants, Chicago, IL: Institute of Design and Chicago Kent 
College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Szabo, Mark (2010) Design 
Thinking in Legal Practice Management, Boston, MA: Design Management 
Institute; Clarke, John A. and Borys, Bryan D. (2011) ‘Usability is free: 
Improving efficiency by making the court more user friendly’, Future Trends 
in State Courts, 76; Mastarone, Ginnifer L. and Feinberg, Susan (2007) 
‘Access to Legal Services: Organizing Better Self help Systems’, Professional 
Communication Conference; Lippe, Paul (2013) ‘Do lawyers have the 
“design mojo” needed to re think the delivery of legal services?’, ABA Journal: 
Legal Rebels, December; Ball, W. David (2014) ‘Redesigning sentencing’, 
McGeorge Law Review, 46, 817.
15 See, for example, Clarke, Amanda and Craft, Jonathan (2018) ‘The twin 
faces of public sector design’, Governance, 32(1), 5–21; Clarke, Amanda 
and Craft, Jonathan (2017) ‘The vestiges and vanguards of policy design 
in a digital context’, Canadian Public Administration, 60(4), 476–97; 
Anthopoulos, Leo G., Siozos, Panagiotis and Tsoukalas, Ioannis A. (2007) 
‘Applying participatory design and collaboration in digital public services for 
discovering and re designing e Government services’, Government Information 
Quarterly, 24(2), 353–76. There has also been some interesting design 
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has now become widely influential in the UK civil service 
and is gradually replacing, at least partially, the traditional top-
down (or ‘waterfall’) approaches of civil servants in a variety of 
important policy areas.16 This is a key cultural change within 
central government that the digitalisation of administrative 
justice is simultaneously perpetuating and being shaped by. The 
most obvious manifestation of this trend to those outside of 
administration is how the language of governance is embracing a 
new vocabulary: ‘digital by default’, ‘agile’, ‘open’, ‘innovation’, 
‘platform’.17 This is not meaningless bureaucratic language, but 
representative of important underlying changes of practice.
This chapter reflects on the increasing influence of agile 
processes in relation to the design of the administrative justice 
system. It starts by outlining the recent record of government 
IT projects, how agile methods were embraced as part of an 
attempt to avoid repeating historical failures, and what the main 
components of the approach are. I also draw on the limited 
evidence available to show how these approaches are being used 
in practice in the ongoing HMCTS tribunal reforms. I then 
turn to address how the ‘politics’ of agile are developing, ranging 
from the ‘evangelicals’, who believe the approach will herald a 
revolution in justice, to the ‘anti-designers’, who suggest that 
design processes involving technology may even pose threats 
work in the context of the tax system; see Preston, Alan (2009) ‘Designing 
the Australian Tax System’, in Richard J. Boland and Fred Collopy (eds) 
Managing as Designing, Berkeley, CA: Stanford University Press; Terrey, 
Nina (2012) ‘Managing by Design – A Case Study of the Australian Taxation 
Office’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Canberra.
16 Policy is also now part of the design movement. For an overview, see Bobrow, 
Davis B. (2006) ‘Policy Design: Ubiquitous, Necessary, and Difficult’, in B. 
Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (eds) Handbook of Public Policy, London: Sage 
Publications, pp 281–315; Bason (note 4 above). For a popular account of 
these ideas in the UK, see Hilton, Steve (2015) More Human: Designing a 
World Where People Come First, London: W.H. Allen & Co.
17 O’Reilly, Tim (2011) ‘Government as a platform’, Innovations, 6(1), 13–40.
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to key tenets of modern constitutionalism. After sketching 
out the emerging politics around agile, I show how its growth 
represents changing models of designing administrative justice. 
In particular, that it is attempting to shift emphasis on to users’ 
preferences – something that I suggest ought to be welcomed but 
also potentially puts more traditional legal and good governance 
values in a precarious position. Finally, I look at the design of 
the agile process itself, making some recommendations on how 
it can potentially become more effective.
My overall argument is that, on the basis of the present 
evidence, the best hope for agile methods must be that they 
achieve the best systems within pre-established policy objectives 
and the practical realities of government. However, for the 
promised benefits of agile methods to be achieved, it must be 
applied with integrity. Moreover, greater thought must be given 
to how wider concerns and practice of public law and good 
administration fit alongside the agile method.
How agile developed and how it works
Historically, government has been a place where major IT 
projects faced almost certain disaster. The public sector has a 
long record of expensive failures and under-used services.18 This 
has been a problem in many countries, but the UK has been 
described in such terms as ‘ground zero for IT management 
failures’19 and ‘a world leader in ineffective IT schemes for 
government.’20 IT failures within UK government have taken 
various forms: spiralling costs, delays and the collapse of proposed 
18 Dunleavy, Patrick, Margetts, Helen, Bastow, Simon and Tinkler, Jane (2008) 
Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and e-Government, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19 Clarke, Amanda (2017) Digital Government Units: Origins, Orthodoxy and 
Critical Considerations for Public Management Theory and Practice, Working 
Paper, p 5.
20 Dunleavy et al, p 70 (note 18 above).
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reforms. The reasons for such failures have been multi-layered 
and complex.21 Things have, however, changed in recent years. 
Against a backdrop of widespread condemnation of IT projects, 
growing expense, a global financial crisis and various reports,22 
the Government Digital Service was established. Introduced 
in 2011 as ‘Alphagov’, the Government Digital Service is 
a unit within the Cabinet Office with a mandate across the 
whole of government concerning digital strategy, services, 
hiring and procurement. Within a very short period of time, 
the Government Digital Service was widely seen as the global 
leader in digital government. It even topped the United Nations’ 
E-government rankings.23
The Government Digital Service is seen as the first of a new 
breed of administrative organisations that have now spread 
across the world: government digital units.24 Government 
digital units have certain distinctive features: they operate at 
the centre of the administration; they adopt a unified approach 
across government and borrow heavily from the tech sector in 
terms of their operational style; they introduce ‘start-up’ cultures 
associated with tech companies and prioritise user-centred 
design (adopting ‘design-thinking’ approaches); they exhibit a 
preference for data-driven decision-making; and they combine 
in-house talent with contracted-in talent to pursue government-
led projects.25 Government digital units typically also set down 
21 Clarke (note 19 above).
22 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2011) 
Government and IT – ‘A recipe for rip-offs’: Time for a new approach, HC 
715-I; Lane-Fox, Martha (2010) Directgov 2010 and Beyond: Revolution 
not Evolution (www.gov.uk/government/publications/directgov-2010-and-
beyond-revolution-not-evolution-a-report-by-martha-lane-fox).
23 UN (United Nations) Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2016) 
UN E-Government Survey 2016.
24 Similar configurations have been introduced in the US, Canada and Australia.
25 Clarke (note 19 above). 
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criteria through service standard that all government digital 
services must comply with before they are put into action.
While government digital units are a growing trend 
internationally, they are still in their early days and there is 
limited research on them. Some questions also arise about their 
performance. Such units are not necessarily an all-conquering 
solution. In practice, these units have, perhaps quite naturally, 
sought to tackle ‘low hanging fruit’ first, fixing easy problems 
and making easy gains. This would, of course, make it easier 
to build an overall successful portfolio and make claims for 
further investment etc. More complex tasks – concerning, for 
example, large-scale organisational reforms such as the ongoing 
HMCTS reforms – may prove more difficult. The National 
Audit Office has noted that ‘while many government services 
are now available online … departments and [the Government 
Digital Service] have struggled to manage more complicated 
programmes and to improve the complex systems and processes 
that support public services.’26 However, the Government 
Digital Service has reported that 12 of the 25 projects on its 
initial work programme will see the benefits outweigh the costs 
of development within 10 years. It has been further observed 
that there is a real possibility of resistance to government digital 
units from within administration itself. There are many reports 
of UK civil servants disliking the ‘invasion’ of the Government 
Digital Service. The following quote, from a former Cabinet 
Office employee in 2012, demonstrates vividly this sentiment:
I think the interesting thing is if you talk to civil servants 
who aren’t kind of “GDSonites” then they say “oh GDS 
is such arrogant wankers coming in and telling us how to 
do our jobs.” I mean I’m sure you’ve come across – I’m 
sure you’ve experienced the reputation of GDS within 
26 National Audit Office (2017) Digital Transformation in Government, p 7.
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Whitehall, as you know not entirely positive. You know 
they are seen to be arrogant.27
Such internal dynamics can lead to difficulties, the possibility of 
resistance to digitalisation and the need for outreach work within 
government. The Government Digital Service is actively seeking 
to combat this perception via outreach initiatives, for example, 
explaining its role to civil servants through a Digital Academy. 
More importantly, government digital units may also raise serious 
accountability questions. As the technology revolution continues 
to take hold, provision and control of government digital services 
and infrastructure will become increasingly important. With 
the digital unit model, it has been suggested that ‘the lines of 
accountability linking political decision-makers to government 
programming and spending [have] become blurred’, and that 
this challenge is ‘particularly acute in Westminster systems, with 
their vertical lines of individual ministerial accountability.’28 On 
top of all of this, government digital units require sustained 
political support and can be very expensive.
Despite it still being early days in their development, it is 
apparent that the rise of government digital units is effectively 
creating what Amanda Clarke has dubbed a ‘new government-
IT orthodoxy’.29 Certain key features define this shift. First, 
a preference for ‘agile’ user-centric development, with heavy 
use of prototyping. Second, changes in procurement methods, 
including more reliance on in-house talent and more use of 
(when outsourcing is used) small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Third, the use of ‘open’ standards that allow solutions to be 
shared and reused across government (the Government Digital 
Service describes this approach as one that aggregates demand 
across government for common services but disaggregates the 
27 Clarke, p 32 (note 19 above). 
28 Ibid, p 36.
29 Ibid, p 15.
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supply of these services). Fourth, the creation of government-
wide policies on digital initiatives. And fifth, the building of a 
new culture around digital service.
One core aspect of this ‘new orthodoxy’ of technology 
in government is the growing use of agile design processes. 
The agile approach is now routinely found in any aspect of 
government where the Government Digital Service has been 
involved. In the context of the HMCTS reforms discussed in 
Chapter Three, the Government Digital Service has been very 
influential and the agile approach has been widely adopted in 
order to implement those changes. HMCTS’ specific model has 
the following four stages:
1. Discovery: Finding out what users need, what to measure and 
what the constraints are.
2. Alpha: Building a prototype, testing it with users and learning about 
it.
3. Beta: Scaling up and going public.
4. Live: Learning how continuously to improve the live service.
This approach has also been adopted alongside the ‘Digital 
Service Standard’, which the Government Digital Service states 
that ‘all public facing transactional services must meet.’30 This 
Standard includes requirements to ‘understand user needs’, ‘do 
ongoing user research’, ‘use agile methods’ and ‘iterate and 
improve frequently’. HMCTS has also adopted new tools – such 
as journey and stakeholder mapping – that are traditionally part 
of the agile approach. These new agile approaches – manifesting 
how ‘digital-era policy design instruments tend to privilege 
the participation of non-government actors in government 
30 Gov.uk (no date) ‘Digital Service Standard’ (www.gov.uk/service-manual/
service-standard). A design manual is also available, which includes 
processes for system design and testing.
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activities’31 through what are commonly called ‘co-production’ 
techniques32 – have synchronised easily with the increasing 
emphasis placed on the ‘user perspective’ in administrative justice 
policy in recent decades.33
Aside from the Government Digital Service, Policy Lab – a 
small team within the Cabinet Office established in 2014 – has 
also made a concerted effort to promote agile methods within 
government. Policy Lab was created as part of wider changes to 
the Civil Service.34 In response to challenges from politicians, 
academia, the press and others, the Civil Service Reform Plan was 
made in 2012. It made a commitment to make ‘open policy-
making’ the default approach. This meant that policy-making 
should draw on a full range of external experts, from academics 
to those who will deliver the policy. It was also promised that 
civil servants working on policy will have the necessary skills 
and expertise, can use up-to-date tools and techniques, and 
have a clear understanding of what works in practice.35 One 
31 Clarke and Craft (2017), p 482 (note 15 above).
32 Joshi, Anuradha and Moore, Mick (2004) ‘Institutionalised co-production: 
Unorthodox public service delivery in challenging environments’, Journal of 
Development Studies, 40(4), 31–49. See also Bovaird, Tony and Loeffler, 
Elke (2013) We’re All in this Together: Harnessing User and Community Co-
Production of Public Outcomes, Birmingham: Institute of Local Government 
Studies, University of Birmingham.
33 For some background discussion on the rise of user-centred design in 
administrative justice policy, see Tomlinson, Joe (2017) ‘The grammar of 
administrative justice values’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 
39(4), 524–37.
34 For background on the creation of Policy Lab, see Kimbell, Lucy (2015) 
Applying Design Approaches to Policy Making: Discovering Policy Lab, 
Brighton: University of Brighton; Bailey, Jocelyn and Lloyd, Peter (2016) 
‘The Introduction of Design to Policymaking: Policy Lab and the UK 
Government’, Design Research Society 50th Anniversary Conference. For 
a wider discussion on the development of this type of organisation, see 
Bellafontaine, Teresa (2013) Innovation Labs: Bridging Think Tanks and 
Do Tanks, Policy Horizons Canada.
35 HM Government (2012) Civil Service Reform Plan, June.
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year later, a Civil Service report promised to fund a Policy Lab 
to promote innovative techniques such as design thinking to 
approach policy problems in a new way.36 It also promised to 
develop a culture where there was openness to new evidence, 
which would involve a broader range of experts and processes 
where practical experimentation would be the starting point for 
solving problems. This means that developing process designs 
by trialling, testing and iterating was widely encouraged. The 
ongoing remit of Policy Lab is to support policy-makers to 
change their approach to policy-making by demonstrating new 
tools and techniques, offering skills training and facilitating 
long-term shifts in policy-making practice.37 Policy Lab works 
with a range of partners within government and sees its work 
as pushing for design-led change within the policy-making 
community in government.38
It is unclear exactly how agile processes have been working 
in practice, especially in the context of the HMCTS reforms to 
courts and tribunals.39 Indeed, further research into the dynamics 
of these processes would be very insightful in terms of both 
understanding the process – what its benefits and limitations 
are – and how its operation may be improved in the context of 
administrative justice going forwards. The most information, in 
the context of the HMCTS reforms, is known about the agile 
method as it is being applied in the context of putting the social 
security tribunal on a digital footing. A summary released by 
government gives an impression of the scale and nature of this 
exercise.40 From June 2017 to October 2018, the team focusing 
36 Civil Service (2013) Twelve Actions to Professionalise Policy Making: A 
Report by the Policy Profession Board, October.
37 Kimbell, p 5 (note 34 above).
38 Ibid.
39 The best resource for this has been the Inside HMCTS Blog, https://
insidehmcts.blog.gov.uk
40 These numbers are based on the most charitable reading of the data 
published under FOIA Request No 180918020.
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on the tribunal conducted seven rounds of ‘discovery’ research 
and eight rounds of ‘alpha’ testing. The testing was done with 
a variety of users: appellants, judges, senior medical members 
of the tribunals, claimant representatives and the DWP. For the 
testing, the total number of users engaged by the time the data 
was produced was 68; 29 were appellants and 26 were judges, 
along with two expert medical members of tribunals. From the 
DWP, five officials and five presenting officers were involved. 
One representative was spoken to. Most of the ‘lab’ testing 
sessions were done in London (13), with other labs being held in 
Manchester (1), Birmingham (1) and Newcastle (1). One session 
was held remotely. Around this, a series of more traditional 
research projects – such as surveys – were undertaken, but little 
is known about those exercises. What this information suggests 
is that the testing activities within the agile process being used in 
the HMCTS reform programme are, in practice, on a relatively 
small scale. There may be more activities occurring now, but 
the general opaqueness of agile processes makes this impossible 
to establish at present.
Beyond waterfall: changing models of design
How can we understand the shift in approach that is occurring 
in administrative justice design processes? The key change 
appears to be one of emphasis, from professional (civil servant) 
judgement to user judgement.41 In other words, the traditional 
‘waterfall’ model of design is being rejected where agile 
methods are adopted, at least partially.42 Instead of system 
designs originating within the administration based on internal 
41 On the emphasis of users generally, see Mintrom, Michael and Luetjens, 
Joannah (2016) ‘Design thinking in policymaking processes: Opportunities 
and challenges’, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 75(3), 391.
42 How design approaches link in with traditional approaches remains an 
unresolved question.
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views on what operational demands are, the new model of 
design seeks to have civil servants relinquish some degree of 
control via prioritising user preferences. These preferences are 
understood through the activities of prototyping, testing and 
research. From one perspective, this involves opening up what 
used to be a relatively closed policy discussion about system 
design to involve users. This is part of a wider trend in public 
administration towards user participation in the design process 
– other methods, aside from agile design, have also been used 
to achieve similar ends. For instance, many administrations are 
trialling the crowdsourcing of policy with the aim of increasing 
participation and finding better results.43 This shift in orientation 
is also represented in how theories of public administration in the 
emerging digital era have moved from traditional Weberian ideas 
of structured bureaucracy44 to emphasising non-governmental 
actors being part of a more open process of designing the state.45
In seeking to change the nature of the conversation to 
be more open, what preferences are most prominent in the 
conversation may also change. Under the old model, the 
43 See, for example, Aitamurto, Tanja and Landemore, Helene (2015) ‘Five 
design principles for crowdsourced policymaking: Assessing the case of 
crowdsourced off-road traffic law in Finland’, Journal of Social Media 
for Organizations, 2(1), 1–19; Gao, Huji, Wang, Xufei, Barbier, Geoffrey 
and Liu, Huan (2011) ‘Promoting Coordination for Disaster Relief – From 
Crowdsourcing to Coordination’, in John Salerno, Shanchieh Jay Yang, 
Dana Nau and Sun-Ki Chai (eds) Social Computing, Behavioural-Cultural 
Modelling, and Prediction, Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 197–204. 
44 Weber, Max (1922) Economy and Society, Chapter 11. 
45 Dunleavy et al (note 18 above); Noveck, Beth Simone (2009) Wiki 
Government: How Technology Can Make Government Better, Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institute Press; O’Reilly (note 17 above); Dunleavy, Patrick 
and Hood, Christopher (1994) ‘From old public administration to new 
public management’, Public Money & Management, 14(3), 9–16; Pollitt, 
Christopher and Bouckaert, Geert (2011) Public Management Reform: A 
Comparative Analysis: New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-
Weberian State, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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priorities as determined by policy officials were central. Broadly 
speaking, these were often understood to be concerns of system-
manageability (for example, cost and speed of processing) and 
classical values of good governance (for example, procedural 
fairness, independence). User needs may have also been factored 
in to the process but traditionally, this would be done based on 
working out what a rational user would require. By including 
users more directly in the conversation about the design of 
systems, other preferences may gain more traction. For instance, 
considerations such as convenience and speed – often understood 
to be key preferences of users – may be given much more 
emphasis if user input is taken into account seriously.46
It is important to note, however, that the agile design model 
does not actually pass decision-making control to users, as 
that remains with government. The impact of widening the 
conversation is dependent on how views are factored in overall 
by officials. Moreover, when agile methods and processes 
are adopted, they are used within the limits of the relevant 
department’s budget (which is usually fixed in advance) and 
broadly pre-established policy objectives. This means that the 
conversation that is opened up is typically narrow; for instance, 
it is about how a system or part of a system operates online rather 
than if a system operates online. 
An emerging politics of design?
Agile methodologies have, as noted above, been adopted 
across various sectors. Given this rapid growth, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a politics around the use of agile design 
methodologies is now starting to emerge. A range of positions 
46 Berthoud, Richard and Bryson, Alex (1997) ‘Social security appeals: What 
do the claimants want?’, Journal of Social Security Law, 4(1), 17–41; 
Richardson, Genevra and Genn, Hazel (2007) ‘Tribunals in transition’, 
Public Law, 116.
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can be taken, in particular in relation to governments’ use of 
this approach, running from the more to the less enthusiastic. 
It is helpful to categorise views into four commonly held 
viewpoints.47
First, there are those who may be labelled the evangelicals. These 
are people who suggest that agile methodologies are waiting 
to revolutionise the administrative justice system, and the rest 
of the world needs to catch up. There are many international 
conferences on agile methodologies and legal design. These are 
often not forums primarily for critical reflection of the approach 
itself, but more for discussion on how the approach can be 
advanced, applied and promoted. For advocates of this approach, 
it could even be suggested that democratic participation is 
enhanced through agile processes, as individuals have a greater 
role in the process of designing government.48
Second, there are the moderate advocates. These are those who 
promote design thinking as an idea but also seek to question its 
application and how it integrates into extant ways of thinking 
about administrative justice. Canadian administrative law scholar 
Lorne Sossin is a good example of a moderate advocate. In a 
recent article, he stated his belief that ‘design frameworks will 
transform how we think about administrative justice.’49 His claim 
was that design thinking, and in particular, user-centred design, 
has been ‘too often is missing in the design of administrative 
tribunals.’50 Instead, he suggests, when lawyers have focused 
on design they have focused on design in a narrow legal sense, 
47 These are generally broad characterisations of different viewpoints.
48 For a discussion on this point, see O’Reilly (note 17 above); Noveck (note 
45 above); Margetts, Helen and Dunleavy, Patrick (2013) ‘The second wave 
of digital-era governance: A quasi-paradigm for government on the Web’, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical 
and Engineering Sciences, 371.
49 Sossin, Lorne (2017) ‘Designing administrative justice’, Windsor Yearbook 
of Access to Justice, 34(1), 87–111.
50 Ibid, p 87.
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such as the design of statutory mandates and procedures.51 At 
the same time, in government, a ‘top-down’ policy-making 
process that serves the interests of a ruling government has been 
adopted.52 The result, Sossin claims, is that the ‘administrative 
justice system in Canada at all levels of Government (federal, 
provincial, municipal, Indigenous) is generally fragmented, 
poorly coordinated, under-resourced in relation to the needs 
of its users and has multiple barriers of entry.’53 His view is 
that the application of design thinking, with its ‘bottom-up’ 
philosophy, will lead to overall better systems. Sossin, however, 
acknowledges that many tenets of the design-thinking approach 
that he outlines have long been promoted, by academics and 
by others.54 He takes the position that agile methods are an 
evolution of an existing and helpful approach, the application 
of which needs to be expanded.
Third, there are the sceptics, who are uncertain what the agile 
approach adds to existing ways of thinking about designing 
administrative justice systems. The concern here is that the 
adoption of agile methods may represent no more than 
superficial language that dresses up the process of administrative 
justice reform in bureaucratic language, potentially even 
obfuscating important issues of substantive policy and process 
design as a result.
Finally, and this is perhaps the most interesting of categories, 
there appears to be an emerging school of anti-designers. A 
51 Ibid, p 87. For instance, Sossin cites from the Canadian context: Ellis, Ron 
(1987) ‘Administrative tribunal design’, Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Law & Practice, 1, 134; Ellis, Ron (2013) Unjust by Design: Canada’s 




54 See, for example, Leggatt, Andrew (2001) Tribunals for Users: One System, 
One Service, Report of the Review of Tribunals, London: Ministry of Justice, 
paras 15.16–15.17.
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clear articulation of this type of stance, albeit made in the 
context of regulation, has been offered by Deirdre Mulligan 
and Kenneth Bamberger, two US scholars who launched a 
critique of ‘governance by design’.55 They argue that design 
approaches ‘bake in’ certain types of political preference, and 
that conventional structures of accountability are ‘fundamentally 
ill-equipped’ to provide effective scrutiny of this. The risk 
they identify is that design approaches may subvert traditional 
models of public governance.56 They argue that ‘governance-
by-design has undermined important governance norms’ and its 
form, coupled with the lack of space for scrutiny, means there 
has rarely been ‘a meta-discussion about when and whether it 
is appropriate to enlist technology in the service of values at 
all.’57 The result may be that the outcome of a design process 
is that key choices ‘recede from the political as they become 
what “is” rather than what [democratic] politics has determined 
ought to be.’58
Agile as institutional design
Thinking about the ‘design of design’ may seem odd, but it 
is important. The process by which systems are created are 
naturally vital to the system citizens ultimately experience. It is 
important therefore to consider the positive and negative features 
of any design process.
At the outset, it ought to be noted that agile approaches have 
some features that may be considered helpful. First, they can 
lower the risk of large-scale disasters. Building systems piece by 
55 Mulligan, Deirdre K. and Bamberger, Kenneth A. (2018) ‘Saving governance-
by-design’, California Law Review, 106(3), 697–784. The argument in this 
article has a wider scope than just agile processes, but it engages with similar 
concerns about ‘design’ method in the context of government technology.
56 Ibid.




JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL STATE
piece can mean that problems can be more easily located and 
fixed than in one large system. It also avoids the moment where 
there is one ‘big-bang’ roll-out of a new process (which carries 
the potential for huge disaster). This is because, under the agile 
method, new processes incrementally go online after rounds of 
testing. Agile may also more easily facilitate feedback to allow 
for improvement beyond the initial design phase.59 Second, 
agile methods can give users of the system a greater voice in the 
design process. It has often been observed that administrative 
justice processes have been influenced by elite users of the 
system – particularly lawyers – rather than ordinary citizens.60 
At the same time, agile processes can also allow the actual voices 
of users to be heard, rather than assumptions being made about 
what users want or how they experience processes. Finally, agile 
processes seek to foster a greater emphasis on evidence-based 
policy-making. This has long been argued to be necessary by 
administrative justice commentators.61 With the growth of 
digital processes, there is also the possibility of capturing more 
detailed data on administrative justice processes (although there 
are debates around what data precisely should be collected, what 
data should be made public and what data should be shared 
across government). Agile processes may allow the most to be 
made of ‘big data’ through directly incorporating searching for 
all available evidence into the process.
Agile processes have various features, however, which may 
limit their effectiveness. There are two main types of limitation. 
First, there are those limitations that are intrinsic to the method 
itself. For instance, the iterative aspect of the agile method 
means that when research and testing is conducted, it is usually 
59 For a wider discussion of the role of this kind of feedback, see Coleman, 
Stephen and Gotz, John (2001) Bowling Together: Online Public Engagement 
in Policy Deliberation, London: Hansard Society.
60 See, for example, Sossin (note 49 above).
61 For a recent example, see UK Administrative Justice Institute (2018) 
Research Roadmap.
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on specific parts of a process. Due to this, there remains a need 
for changes to be assessed in the wider systems in which they 
exist, as well as end-to-end testing of the overall processes that 
are built. Moreover, working in an iterative way can make it 
difficult for external stakeholders, including external researchers, 
experts and those affected by changes, to engage with the 
design process. Agile processes also put emphasis on what users 
want. As explained above, there may be many good reasons for 
installing processes that turn the dial in this direction. However, 
there is a risk with the present procedure of over-reliance on 
the user perspective, and care must be taken not to too willingly 
emphasise values often preferred by users – such as convenience 
– over traditional concerns such as procedural fairness.62 With 
technologists and civil servants exercising a large amount of 
control over the important details of the design of systems, the 
importance of classical legal values, such as fair process, may 
get lost. Lord Reed, in the landmark UNISON ruling, gave a 
warning to this effect:
… [t]he importance of the rule of law is not always 
understood. Indications of a lack of understanding include 
the assumption that the administration of justice is merely 
a public service like any other, that courts and tribunals 
are providers of services to the “users” who appear 
before them, and that the provision of those services is of 
value only to the users themselves and to those who are 
remunerated for their participation in the proceedings.’63
Agile design risks justice processes being conceived as ‘merely 
a public service like any other.’
The financial costs of user research and testing may prove a 
further limitation. For example, to do effective user research, 
62 Berthoud and Bryson (note 46 above); Richardson and Genn (note 46 above).
63 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 [66].
82
JUSTICE IN THE DIGITAL STATE
research teams, that take relatively long periods of time to work, 
are required. The reliance on engaging with users could also 
present problems in some contexts. Tracking down users of the 
justice system willing to spend time talking with government 
about their experiences with government may pose problems. 
Some may be worried about engaging and others may not want 
to engage at all. It may even be difficult to find users in the first 
place. For instance, in respect of immigration tribunals, users may 
speak different languages, many have left the country and many 
may be cautious about disclosing information to government 
based on past negative experiences. The issues around the 
practical implementation, financial and otherwise, of the agile 
method may ultimately lead to user research and testing only 
being conducted on a small scale. This could undermine how 
representative, and therefore reliable, the outcomes of agile 
processes are. At the same time, this can give the impression 
that it provides ‘more heat than fire with rhetoric far outpacing 
its uptake.’64
It must also be highlighted that agile testing is not public and 
focuses on narrow topics. It cannot therefore be seen as a proxy 
for deliberative, public debate or even traditional forms of public 
consultation. The relationship between traditional forms of 
public consultation and agile testing presents various tensions. 
In the current HMCTS reforms this tension is perhaps best 
demonstrated by how observers are complaining about a lack 
of consultation whereas the government feels as though it has 
been constantly consulting. This ultimately goes to a wider issue 
of how ‘the role of individual citizens and non-governmental 
64 Clarke and Craft (2017) (note 15 above). See also Clarke, Amanda (2014) 
Government-Citizen Relations on the Social Web: Canada and the United 
Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Clarke, Amanda and Francoli, 
Mary (2017) ‘Digital Government and Permanent Campaigning’, in Alex 
Marland, Anna Lennox Esselment and Thierry Giasson (eds) Permanent 
Campaigning in Canada, Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia 
Press, 241–58.
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organizations in social problem solving [by government] remains 
unclear in the digital age.’65
Finally, there are questions about the capacity of governments 
to move from traditional modes of working to new agile 
processes. Some studies have suggested this may be a key 
problem,66 particularly in relation to the capacity of government 
to understand how to integrate new forms of evidence gathered 
by more citizen participation and big data.67
A second set of limitations relates to the application of agile 
methods in the wider context of political and governmental 
reality.68 In this wider setting, agile methods are typically deployed 
within broadly pre-established policy objectives, meaning the 
results of the process, no matter how well-managed the method 
is, will also been limited. Governments may choose to reform 
a process for a number of reasons, and these motivating reasons 
often shape the overall process.69 Perhaps most significantly, since 
agile processes have become more prevalent in the UK, they 
have usually been deployed within certain budget structures in 
mind, specifically, with the need to reduce costs or to ensure 
effective working within restricted budgets. If resources are 
scarce, there is simply going to be a limit to what is possible. 
65 Clarke and Craft (2017), p 484 (note 15 above).
66 Mergel, Ines and Desouza, Kevin C. (2013) ‘Implementing open innovation 
in the public sector: The case of challenge.gov’, Public Administration 
Review, 73(6), 882–90; Clarke, Amanda (2019) Opening the Government 
of Canada: The Federal Bureaucracy in the Digital Age, Vancouver, BC: 
University of British Columbia Press.
67 Painter, Martin and Pierre, Jon (2005) ‘Unpacking Policy Capacity: Issues 
and Themes’, in M. Painter and J. Pierre (eds) Challenges to State Policy 
Capacity: Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp 1–18.
68 Clarke and Craft (2017) (note 15 above). For further discussion, see 
Considine, Mark (2012) ‘Thinking outside the box? Applying design theory 
to public policy’, Politics & Policy, 40(4), 704–24. 
69 Le Sueur and Bondy (note 2 above). There is very limited literature directly 
addressing the issue.
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The highest aim, therefore, can only be that agile methods have 
features that allow for the development of the best process within 
the money that is available. There also remains an old problem: 
the operational gap between government departments.70 This 
wider institutional issue within central government can risk 
undermining drastically the benefit of agile approaches. There 
is little sense, for example, in HMCTS designing a user-friendly 
online social security tribunal procedure which is preceded 
by processes in the DWP that are often seen to be not user-
friendly at all.71 Calls for ‘joined-up’ thinking in administrative 
justice are nothing new. However, the lack of coordination 
between different government departments can undermine the 
deployment of the user-centred agile approach. Finally, there are 
obvious questions about how comfortably evidence fits alongside 
the more expressly political dynamics within administration.72
Recommendations
It is as axiomatic as anything is in administrative justice that 
making systems better for users is a good idea. The tricky 
questions relate to how that happens and the extent to which 
user preferences should be given priority. For the benefits of 
agile, as promised by it advocates, to be realised, the approach 
must be applied with integrity. Practically, the realities of 
government – with, for example, tight budgets and departmental 
70 Freedland, Mark (1999) ‘The Crown and the Changing Nature of 
Government’, in Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (eds) The Nature of 
the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Chapter 5.
71 See, for example, Thomas, Robert and Tomlinson, Joe (2019: forthcoming) 
‘A different tale of judicial power: Administrative review as a problematic 
response to the judicialisation of tribunals’, Public Law, which shows the 
effects the DWP’s MR pre-appeal process has on the operation of the tribunal.
72 Cairney, Paul (2016) The Politics of Evidence-based Policy Making, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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silos – make this tricky. Furthermore, the limitations of the 
method – even when applied with integrity – must be accepted. 
Agile methods are typically deployed within broadly pre-
established policy objectives, meaning the results of the process, 
no matter how well executed, will also be so limited. As such, 
it is difficult for agile methods to be thought of as a substitute 
for genuine public debate and consultation.
The best hope for agile methods must be that they achieve 
the best systems within pre-established policy objectives and 
the practical realties of government. Time will tell if this is the 
case in practice, and further investigation into the dynamics of 
these processes would be insightful, in terms of both developing 
understanding and improving the process. However, for now, 
various steps could be taken to improve the present design 
process. In particular, thought could be given to how wider 
concerns of ethics and good governance fit within the agile 
method, as well as allowing wider external engagement with 
the process. In this respect, a series of relatively low-cost 
improvements are possible. First, the fragmented nature of agile 
methods means that, even within the parameters of a particular 
design process, there may be a lack of joined-up thinking. 
Adopting end-to-end testing of processes at various stages could 
mitigate this risk. Second, to ensure traditional concerns of 
public law and good government – such as procedural fairness 
– are fully considered and not displaced inappropriately by user 
preferences, consideration should be given to setting up expert 
advisory groups on particular projects or to creating a good 
governance standard, to sit alongside the Government Digital 
Service’s Service Standard. The aim would be to promote wider 
considerations than the agile method may directly facilitate. And 
third, to allow more external engagement with design processes, 
a commitment could be made that research undertaken within 
government as part of a design process – wherever practicable 
and within the appropriate limits of data protection laws, research 
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ethics etc – will be published, even if only in summary form.73 
This could improve transparency and facilitate a wider public 
conversation.
73 Instructive discussion and helpful principles can be found in Sedley, Sir 
Stephen (2016) Missing Evidence: An Inquiry into the Delayed Publication 
of Government Commissioned Research, Sense About Science.
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Digitalisation in the context of the administrative justice 
system presents a wide variety of issues. The case studies in this 
book have demonstrated that. It is essential that the ongoing 
incursion of digital technology into administrative justice is not 
seen as some distinct field of interest and activity, but as part 
of the core business of those concerned with public law and 
administrative justice. There will be no satisfying overall answer 
or theory that can be developed in response to this incursion. 
In administrative justice, generalisations are often unhelpful and 
rarely true. Different instances of digitalisation – whether they 
are imposed as part of public service provision or arise organically 
from technological innovation – need to be considered in their 
particular institutional and political contexts.
Given this, this book has sought to provide a framework 
for analysing unfolding developments in the digitalisation of 
administrative justice, and not an overarching prescriptive theory. 
It has argued that analysis must reflect on how developments 
with digital technology fit into the central and long-stranding 
administrative justice concerns of evidence, politics, models and 
design. It has highlighted the urgent need to study closely the 
empirical consequences of technology and revisit, and maybe 
89
even abandon, existing frameworks for understanding how 
administrative justice operates. By outlining this path forwards, 
I am essentially re-stating what Richard B. Stewart wrote at the 
end of his famous 1975 essay, ‘The reformation of American 
administrative law’, considering the role of administrative law 
in the context of a changing US state and polity: ‘[g]iven “the 
undefined foreboding of something unknown,” we can know 
only that we must spurn superficial analysis and simplistic 
remedies, girding ourselves to shoulder, for the indefinite future, 
the intellectual and social burdens of a dense complexity.’1
At the conclusion of writing this book, the growing 
digitalisation of administrative justice was forming a subtle 
backdrop for headlines. A report published by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Professor 
Philip Alston, castigated the UK’s approach to welfare provision.2 
A key part of his findings related to the use of new technologies 
in administration. Professor Alston noted how ‘[g]overnment 
is increasingly automating itself with the use of data and new 
technology tools, including AI. Evidence shows that the human 
rights of the poorest and most vulnerable are especially at risk 
in such contexts.’3 Among complaints of a lack of transparency 
and concerns about legal frameworks concerning data, Professor 
Alston saw fit to remind the government that: ‘there is nothing 
inherent in Artificial Intelligence and other technologies that 
enable automation that threatens human rights and the rule of 
1 Stewart, Richard B. (1975) ‘The reformation of American administrative 
law’, Harvard Law Review, 88(8), 1667, p 1813. Citing Hegel, Georg (1949) 
The Phenomenology of Mind (2nd edn, translated by J. Baillie), Mineola, 
NY: Dover Publications, p 75.
2 UN OHCHR (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, Human Rights) 
(2018) ‘Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom’, by Professor Philip 
Alston, United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
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law. The reality is that governments simply seek to operationalize 
their political preferences through technology; the outcomes 
may be good or bad.’4
The team at the DWP, while busy disputing the Special 
Rapporteur’s findings, were also dealing with a ministerial 
transition.5 The Minister for Work and Pensions in post during 
the week of Professor Alston’s visit to the UK, Esther McVey 
MP, had resigned from the Cabinet in protest over the handling 
of Brexit negotiations. Brexit itself will represent another step 
towards reliance on digital administration in the UK. Given the 
amount of administrative change required in a small amount 
of time, it is hardly surprising that technology is being relied 
upon to manage the transition.6 One major example is the EU 
Settlement Scheme, which has been established to enable EU 
citizens and their family members, currently residing within 
the UK, to apply for settled status following the UK’s expected 
withdrawal from the EU.7 To apply, applicants must complete 
an online application.8 As part of this process, individuals must 
demonstrate a continuous period of residency within the UK, 
where they have not been absent from the country for more 
than 6 months within any 12-month period.9 To confirm and 
4 Ibid.
5 See, for example, Walker, Peter (2018) ‘Amber Rudd condemns UN poverty 
report in combative return to frontline politics’, The Guardian, 19 November 
(www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/19/amber-rudd-un-poverty-report-
return-frontline-politics).
6 See, generally, Tomlinson, Joe and Lovdahl Gormsen, Liza (2018) ‘Stumbling 
towards the UK’s new administrative settlement: A study of competition law 
enforcement after Brexit’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 
20, 233–51.
7 Home Office (2018) EU Settlement Scheme: EU Citizens and Their Family 




9 Ibid, p 39.
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establish this period of residency, the Home Office are deploying 
automated checks that engage tax and welfare databases and 
systems.10 Where it has been algorithmically determined that an 
applicant has not met the requirements, they must then provide 
evidence to the contrary. These recent developments only 
reiterate further the urgency of analysing what digital technology 
means for administrative justice. My hope is that the discussion in 
this book has brought attention to, and provided a framework to 
understand and analyse, the wide variety of important challenges 
presented by ensuring justice in an increasingly digital state.
10 Ibid, pp 41, 50. 
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‘’This book addresses issues of 
profound importance. Tomlinson argues 
that the growing use of technology 
forces us to revisit and possibly 
abandon existing ways of understanding 
how administrative justice operates.’’
Maurice Sunkin, University of Essex 
Available Open Access under CC-BY-NC 
licence. 
Exploring how justice is delivered at a time of 
rapid technological transformation, Justice 
in the Digital State exposes urgent issues 
surrounding the modernisation of courts and 
tribunals whilst re-examining the effects of 
technology on established systems.
Case studies investigate the rise of 
crowdfunded judicial reviews, the digitalisation 
of tribunals, and the introduction of ‘agile’ 
methodologies in building administrative 
justice systems.
Joe Tomlinson’s cutting-edge research offers 
an authoritative and much-needed guide for 
navigating through the challenges of digital 
disruption.
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